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Notes
IN RE GRABILL CORPORATION: ANOTHER "NO" FOR JURY
TRIALS IN THE BANKRUPTCY COURTS
I. INTRODUCTION
The United States Supreme Court has interpreted the Seventh
Amendment to grant a right to a jury trial in certain bankruptcy pro-
ceedings.' A debate has emerged among federal courts over whether
bankruptcy courts have the authority to conduct jury trials or whether
such courts must refer jury trial cases to a district court. 2 The authority
1. Granfinanciera, S. A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 64-65 (1989) (holding
that Seventh Amendment right to jury trial applied to fraudulent conveyance
action referred to bankruptcy court).
2. Complicating the jury trial issue is the fact that a bankruptcy proceeding
may be either of two types: core or non-core. 28 U.S.C. § 157 (1988). Several
circuit and district courts have determined that bankruptcy courts do not have
the power to conduct jury trials in any proceeding. See, e.g., Rafoth v. National
Union Fire Ins. Co. (In re Baker & Getty Fin. Servs., Inc.), 954 F.2d 1169, 1173
(6th Cir. 1992) (holding that bankruptcy courts lack statutory authority to con-
duct jury trials); Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Frates (In re Kaiser Steel Corp.), 911 F.2d
380, 391-92 (10th Cir. 1990) (holding that bankruptcy courts lack statutory au-
thority to conduct jury trials); In re United Mo. Bank, 901 F.2d 1449, 1457 (8th
Cir. 1990) (same); Taxel v. Marine Midland Business Loans, Inc. (In re Palomar
Elec. Supply, Inc.), 138 B.R. 959, 961-63 (S.D. Cal. 1992) (holding that jury
trials in bankruptcy courts are unconstitutional in non-core matters and finding
no statutory grant of power to conduct jury trials in core matters); Torcise v.
Community Bank of Homestead, 131 B.R. 503, 507 (S.D. Fla. 1991) (finding no
express authority and refusing to grant such authority due to Congress' silence
on issue); Growers Packing Co. v. Community Bank of Homestead, 134 B.R.
438, 442-44 (S.D. Fla. 1991) (finding no express or implied power for bank-
ruptcy court to conduct jury trials); Gumport v. Growth Fin. Corp. (In re Trans-
con Lines), 121 B.R. 837, 841 (C.D. Cal. 1990) (finding that "bankruptcy courts
have neither the express nor the implied authority to conduct jury trials over
congressionally designated 'core' or 'non-core' matters that require jury resolu-
tion"); Fimsa, Inc. v. Marina Bay Drive Corp. (In re Marina Bay Drive Corp.), 123
B.R. 222, 222 (S.D. Tex. 1990) (requiring that reference to bankruptcy court be
withdrawn because bankruptcy court could not conduct jury trial).
One circuit court and several district courts have held that bankruptcy
courts may conduct jury trials. See, e.g., Ben Cooper, Inc. v. Insurance Co. of
Pennsylvania (In re Ben Cooper, Inc.), 896 F.2d 1394, 1404 (2d Cir.) (finding
implied grant of authority to bankruptcy courts to conduct jury trials), vacated,
111 S. Ct. 425, and reinstated, 924 F.2d 36 (2d Cir. 1990), and cert. denied, 111 S.
Ct. 2041 (1991); Citicorp N. Am., Inc. v. Finley (In re Washington Mfg. Co.), 133
B.R. 113, 118 (M.D. Tenn. 1991) (finding implied right of authority for bank-
ruptcy courts to conduct jury trials based on intent of Congress derived from
history of statutory grants of power to bankruptcy courts); Salisbury v. Wallace
(In re Wallace), 127 B.R. 1000, 1001 (N.D. Tex. 1991) (holding that bankruptcy
courts have authority to conduct jury trials where right to jury trial is invoked);
Leonard v. Wessel (In reJackson), 118 B.R. 243, 252 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (finding no
(203)
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of bankruptcy courts was granted by Congress pursuant to Article I of
the United States Constitution,3 through the Bankruptcy Amendments
and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984. 4 This authority is limited. It is di-
express or implied congressional authority to conduct jury trials in bankruptcy
courts, but judicially creating such power based on policy considerations).
Some courts have solely determined that bankruptcy courts have no author-
ity to conduct jury trials in non-core proceedings. See, e.g., Taxel v. Electronic Sports
Research (In re Cinematronics, Inc.), 916 F.2d 1444, 1450-51 (9th Cir. 1990)
(holding that bankruptcy courts have no authority to conduct jury trials in non-
core proceedings because of constitutional limitations); Beard v. Braunstein,
914 F.2d 434, 442-43 (3d Cir. 1990) (same); Novak v. Lorenz (In re Novak), 116
B.R. 626, 627 (N.D. Ill. 1990) (finding. that in non-core proceedings, because of
chance that second jury trial would be required on de novo review by district
court, practicalities weigh in favor of removal from bankruptcy court to district
court for jury trial); American Community Servs., Inc. v. Wright Mktg., Inc. (In re
American Community Servs., Inc.), 86 B.R. 681, 689 (D. Utah 1988) (holding
that in non-core proceedings, constitutional concerns require that district court
preside over jury trial); Reda, Inc. v. Harris Trust & Sav. Bank (In re Reda, Inc.),
60 B.R. 178, 182 (Bankr. N.D. II1. 1986) (finding jury trials impermissible in
bankruptcy courts in non-core proceedings).
Certain courts have held that bankruptcy courts may not conduct jury trials
in non-core proceedings without the consent of the parties. See, e.g., West Elecs.,
Inc. v. National Union Fire Ins. Co. (In re West Elecs., Inc.), No. 91-3781(GEB),
1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10957, at *28 (D.NJ. Jan. 9, 1992); National Enters. v.
Koger Partnership, Ltd. (In re Nat'l Enters.), 128 B.R. 956, 963 (E.D. Va. 1991)
(holding that bankruptcy court is powerless to conduct jury trials in non-core
proceeding where parties have not consented to final determination).
Some courts have solely determined that bankruptcy courts do have the au-
thority to conduct just trials in core proceedings. See, e.g., Miller v. Baron (In re
Great Am. Mfg. & Sales, Inc.), 129 B.R. 633, 636-37 (C.D. Cal. 1991) (adopting
reasoning of Ben Cooper and finding implied grant of power to bankruptcy courts
to conduct jury trials in core proceedings); Reading China & Glass Co. v. India
Exotics (In re Reading China & Glass Co.), 126 B.R. 35, 37 (E.D. Pa. 1991) (hold-
ing that bankruptcy court had authority to conduct jury trial in core proceeding);
Walsh v. California Commerce Bank (In re Interbank Mortgage Corp.), 128 B.R.
269, 272-73 (N.D. Cal. 1991) (holding that bankruptcy courts have implied
power to conduct jury trials in core proceedings concerning preferential pay-
ments and that power is constitutional); Kroh Bros. Dev. Co. v. United Mo. Bank
(In re Kroh Bros. Dev. Co.), 108 B.R. 228, 230 (W.D. Mo. 1989) (finding implied
authority for bankruptcy courts to conduct jury trials in core proceedings); Dai-
ley v. First Peoples Bank, 76 B.R. 963, 967 (D.N.J. 1987) (finding implied power
for bankruptcy courts to conduct jury trials in core proceedings because "Con-
gress would have made explicit its desire to abrogate the authority to hear jury
cases had it intended to do so"); McCormick v. American Investors Manage-
ment, Inc. (In re McCormick), 67 B.R. 838, 843 (D. Nev. 1986) (finding implied
power to conduct jury trials in bankruptcy court in core proceedings and pro-
ceedings where parties consent to final determination); M & E Contractors, Inc.
v. Kugler-Morris Gen. Contractors, Inc., 67 B.R. 260, 269 (N.D. Tex. 1986)
(finding that bankruptcy court may conduct jury trials in core proceedings);
Walsh v. Long Beach Honda (In re Gaildeen Indus.), 59 B.R. 402, 407 (N.D. Cal.
1986) (same).
3. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
4. Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L.
No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333; see also Ex parte Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S. 438, 449
(1929) (noting power of Congress to create courts other than courts created
pursuant to Article III of United States Constitution); United Missouri, 901 F.2d at
204
2
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 38, Iss. 1 [1993], Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol38/iss1/5
1993] NOTE 205
rectly limited by Congress' statutory grant of authority.5 In addition,
Congress' statutory grant of authority is itself limited by the Constitu-
tion.6 Therefore, to determine whether bankruptcy courts have the au-
thority to empaneljuries requires an inquiry into whether such authority
was granted by Congress, and, if the authority was so granted, whether
the exercise of such authority is within the confines of the Constitution.
7
Complicating the jury trial issue further is the requirement under
the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984 that a
proceeding in bankruptcy be characterized by the bankruptcy judge as
either "core" or "non-core". 8 This characterization is significant be-
cause the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984
often treats core and non-core matters differently. 9 Also, with respect to
1451-52 (stating that "Article I courts are courts of special jurisdiction created
by Congress"); Plastiras v. Idell (In re Sequoia Auto Brokers, Ltd.), 827 F.2d
1281, 1284 (9th Cir. 1987) ("Congress created bankruptcy courts pursuant to its
substantive authority over bankruptcies.") (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4);
Jeffrey T. Ferriell, Constitutionality of the Bankruptcy Amendments and FederalJudgeship
Act of 1984, 63 AM. BANKR. L.J. 109, 121 (1989).
Section eight, clause four of Article I of the United States Constitution
states that Congress shall have the power "[t]o establish a uniform Rule of Natu-
ralization, and uniform Law on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the
United States." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. Article I courts differ from Article
III courts because the protection and power given to Article I judges are not
equal to that given to Article III judges. See Ferriell, supra, at 121-22. For ex-
ample, while Article III judges have life tenure, Article I judges do not. Id. In
fact, it is because Article III judges have the protection of life-time tenure and
salary that the Constitution vests the power to preside over judicial matters of
the United States in Article III judges. Id. at 121-22. Article III of the Constitu-
tion requires the judges to "hold their Offices during good Behaviour and shall,
at stated Times, receive for their Services, a Compensation which shall not be
diminished during their Continuance in Office." Id. at 121 (quoting U.S. CONST.
Art. III, § 1).
5. United Missouri, 901 F.2d at 1452 (noting that "[t]he authority of the Arti-
cle I court is... limited.., by the powers given to it by Congress"); Sequoia Auto
Brokers, 827 F.2d at 1284 ("Congress vests bankruptcy courts with their jurisdic-
tion and their authority has no 'inherent' source."); see also Baker & Getty, 954
F.2d at 1173 (searching for authority from Congress for bankruptcy courts to
conduct jury trials); Ben Cooper, 896 F.2d at 1402 (examining whether bankruptcy
courts have statutory power to conduct jury trials).
6. United Missouri, 901 F.2d at 1452 (noting that "authority of the Article I
court is . . .circumscribed by the constitution"); see also Ben Cooper, 896 F.2d at
1402 (analyzing whether bankruptcy courts have the "constitutional authority to
conduct [jury] trials").
7. See, e.g., Ben Cooper, 896 F.2d at 1402-04 (analyzing statutory and consti-
tutional authority of bankruptcy courts).
8. 28 U.S.C. § 157 (1988). For a discussion of core and non-core proceed-
ings, see infra notes 51-58 and accompanying text. This Note does not examine
the method of determination to arrive at the characterization of core or non-
core. Rather, this Note begins its analysis with the assumption that a proceeding
has been designated as either core or non-core.
9. For a discussion of the difference in treatment between core and non-
core proceedings in the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of
1984, see infra notes 51-58 and accompanying text.
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the jury trial issue, courts have recognized different considerations de-
pending upon whether the proceeding is core or non-core.10
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit ad-
dressed the issue of whether bankruptcy courts have a statutory grant of
authority to empanel juries in In re Grabill Corp. I t In Grabill, a bank-
ruptcy trustee for Grabill Corporation (Grabill) brought an action in the
United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois against
the National Bank of North Carolina; the case was referred to a bank-
ruptcy court. 12 The trustee alleged that the loan payments that the bank
received from Grabill prior to the institution of bankruptcy proceedings
were preferential and fraudulent.' 3 The trustee demanded a return of
the payments. 14 The National Bank of North Carolina requested a jury
trial. ' 5 Although the parties agreed that the bank was entitled to a jury
trial, the parties differed over whether the bankruptcy court could prop-
erly conduct such a trial.
16
Before reaching its decision in the Grabill case, the Seventh Circuit
considered the decisions of other circuit courts on the jury trial issue.
17
The decisions of six circuit courts are currently the most persuasive au-
thority on the jury trial issue in federal courts.' 8 Of these six circuit
courts, United States Courts of Appeals for the Third and Ninth Circuits
10. For a discussion of the significance of the core/non-core distinction in
judicial decisions on the jury trial issue, see supra note 2.
11. 967 F.2d 1152 (7th Cir. 1992). For a further discussion of the facts of
Grabill, see infra notes 181-91 and accompanying text.
12. Steinberg v. NCNB Nat'l Bank (In re Grabill Corp.), 133 B.R. 621, 622
(N.D. Ill. 1991), rev'd, In re Grabill Corp., 967 F.2d 1152 (7th Cir. 1992). For a
further discussion of the procedural history of Grabill, see infra notes 184-95 and
accompanying text.
13. Grabill, 133 B.R. at 622-23. The trustee alleged that loan payments to-
taling $21,056,297 were made within a year prior to the filing of involuntary
Chapter 7 proceedings. Id. at 622.
14. Id. at 622-23.
15. In re Grabill Corp., 967 F.2d 1152, 1152 (7th Cir.1992).
16. Id. at 1152-53.
17. Id. at 1153. Prior to Grabill, six circuit courts, and various district
courts, addressed the jury trial issue. For a list of the cases addressing the jury
trial issue, see supra note 2.
18. See Rafoth v. National Union Fire Ins. Co. (In re Baker & Getty Fin.
Servs., Inc.), 954 F.2d 1169, 1172-74 (6th Cir. 1992) (holding no statutory au-
thority for bankruptcy courts to conduct jury trials in core proceedings); Taxel v.
Electronic Sports Research (In re Cinematronics, Inc.), 916 F.2d 1444, 1450-51
(9th Cir. 1990) (holding that in non-core proceedings the Constitution pre-
cludes bankruptcy courts from conducting jury trials when the parties have not
consented to final judgment); Beard v. Braunstein, 914 F.2d 434, 442-43 (3d
Cir. 1990) (same); Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Frates (In re Kaiser Steel Corp.), 911
F.2d 380, 390-92 (10th Cir. 1990) (holding no statutory authority for bankruptcy
courts to conduct jury trials in core proceedings); In re United Mo. Bank, 901
F.2d 1449, 1457 (8th Cir. 1990) (same); Ben Cooper, Inc. v. Insurance Co. (In re
Ben Cooper, Inc.), 896 F.2d 1394, 1403-04 (2d Cir.) (holding jury trial permissi-
ble in bankruptcy court), vacated and remanded, 111 S. Ct. 425, reinstated, 924 F.2d
36 (2d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2041 (1991).
[Vol. 38: p. 203206
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have held that bankruptcy courts could not conduct jury trials in non-core
proceedings.19 Both of these courts concluded that even if a grant of au-
thority to bankruptcy courts to conduct jury trials could be inferred,
such a grant would nonetheless be unconstitutional in non-core pro-
ceedings because of problems regarding judicial review. 20 The Sixth,
Eighth and Tenth Circuits have determined that in core proceedings, bank-
ruptcy courts are not statutorily authorized to empanel juries. 2 l Be-
cause these courts determined that Congress did not grant the power to
bankruptcy courts to conduct jury trials, they did not decide the ques-
tion of whether such a statutory grant of power would be constitu-
tional. 22 In contrast to the Sixth, Eighth and Tenth Circuits, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has held that bankruptcy
courts do have an implied grant of authority to empanel juries in core
proceedings. 23 The Second Circuit court also upheld the constitutional-
ity of such authority.
24
With this backdrop, the Seventh Circuit in Grabill followed the ap-
proach taken by the Sixth, Eighth and Tenth Circuits, holding that Con-
gress did not grant bankruptcy courts the authority to hold jury trials in
core proceedings.
25
This Note analyzes the views taken by federal courts, especially that
of the Seventh Circuit, on the jury trial issue to determine how this issue
19. Cinematronics, 916 F.2d at 1451; Beard, 914 F.2d at 443.
20. Cinematronics, 916 F.2d at 1450-51; Beard, 914 F.2d at 442-43. For a
discussion of judicial review problems in bankruptcy cases, see infra notes 107-
18 and accompanying text.
21. See, e.g., Baker & Getty, 954 F.2d at 1173; Kaiser Steel, 911 F.2d at 392;
United Missouri, 901 F.2d at 1457.
22. Baker & Getty, 954 F.2d at 1173 n.10 ("As bankruptcy courts are not
statutorily authorized to conduct jury trials, this court will not address whether
such an authorization would violate Article III of and the Seventh Amendment
to the United States Constitution."); Kaiser Steel, 911 F.2d at 392 (finding no
authorization for bankruptcy judges to conduct jury trials, court concluded that
"[w]here the seventh amendment requires a jury trial to be held in bankruptcy,
that trial must take place in the district court"); United Missouri., 901 F.2d at 1457
(refusing to address constitutional issues because court found no statutory au-
thorization for bankruptcy judges to conduct jury trials). For a further discus-
sion of the constitutional considerations surrounding jury trials in the
bankruptcy courts, see infra notes 66-150 and accompanying text.
23. Ben Cooper, Inc. v. Insurance Co. (In re Ben Cooper, Inc.), 896 F.2d
1394, 1402 (2d Cir.), vacated and remanded, 111 S. Ct. 425, reinstated, 924 F.2d 36
(2d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2041 (1991).
24. Id. at 1403-04. The Second Circuit limited its holding to core proceed-
ings. d. at 1403. The court avoided addressing the jury trial issue in the non-
core proceeding context because the case only involved a core proceeding. Id.
For a discussion of the core and non-core distinction, see infra notes 51-58 and
accompanying text. For a discussion of the additional constitutional problems
the Ben Cooper court would have faced had the matter before the court been non-
core, see infra notes 110-14 and accompanying text.
25. In re Grabill Corp., 967 F.2d 1152, 1158 (7th Cir. 1992). For further
discussion of the Grabill holding, see infra notes 196-229 and accompanying text.
1993] NOTE 207
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should be resolved in light of the relevant policy considerations. The
next section of this Note discusses the authority of bankruptcy courts as
it relates to the jury trial issue. 26 Also addressed is the manner in which
courts other than the Seventh Circuit have dealt with the jury trial is-
sue. 2 7 This Note then presents an analysis of In re Grabill Corp.28 This
Note asserts that the Grabill court properly determined that Congress
has neither expressly nor impliedly authorized bankruptcy courts to con-
duct jury trials. However, although the Grabill court seemingly made the
proper legal decision, the court's policy determinations warrant closer
scrutiny. 29 Contrary to the Grabill court's analysis, this Note concludes
that policy considerations in fact favor the presence of jury trials in lim-
ited bankruptcy court proceedings.3 0 In the final section, this Note pro-
poses that because of the gravity of these policy concerns and the
inability of federal judges to authorize jury trials in bankruptcy courts,
Congress should grant bankruptcy courts the power to empaneljuries in




The determination of whether bankruptcy courts have the power to
empanel juries requires an analysis of the authority of bankruptcy
courts. In this section of this Note, the authority of bankruptcy courts to
conduct jury trials is analyzed through an investigation of the statute
granting authority to bankruptcy courts and the constitutional ramifica-
tions that arise if the power to conduct jury trials is found in that statute.
This section also outlines how circuit courts have resolved these two in-
quiries.3 2 This analysis demonstrates that while it is possible to imply a
26. For a further discussion of the authority of bankruptcy courts, see infra
notes 32-150 and accompanying text.
27. For a further discussion of other cases that have addressed the jury trial
issue, see infra notes 151-78 and accompanying text.
28. For a further discussion of Grabill, see infra notes 179-247 and accompa-
nying text.
29. For a discussion of the policy considerations surrounding the jury trial
issue, see infra notes 254-72 and accompanying text.
30. For a discussion of the policy considerations that weigh in favor of Con-
gress granting the power to the bankruptcy courts to empanel juries, see infra
notes 293-307 and accompanying text.
31. For a further discussion of this Note's conclusion, see infra notes 273-93
and accompanying text. For a discussion of core proceedings, see infra notes 51-
56. For a discussion of the cases in which courts have found a Seventh Amend-
ment right to a jury trial, see infra notes 71-98 and accompanying text. For a
discussion of the safeguards that Congress could incorporate into legislation
granting bankruptcy courts the power to conduct jury trials, see infra notes 308-
10 and accompanying text.
32. For a discussion of the constitutional ramifications of Congress grant-
ing bankruptcy courts the power to conduct jury trials, see infra notes 66-150
and accompanying text. For a discussion of how circuit courts have addressed
the jury trial issue, see infra notes 151-78 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 38: p. 203
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congressional grant of authority, most of the circuit courts that have ad-
dressed this issue have refused to do so. Also evident is that there are
serious constitutional constraints that limit Congress' ability to vest
bankruptcy courts with this authority. 33
A. The Authority of Bankruptcy Courts as Statutorily Defined by Congress
The authority of bankruptcy courts is vested by Congress through
legislation. 34 Therefore, each power exercised by the bankruptcy courts
must be linked to a statute granting that power. 3 5 The statutory power
can be either express or implied in the statute.
36
Congress first granted authority to bankruptcy courts under the
Bankruptcy Act of 1898 (1898 Act). 3 7 That statute did not address jury
trials, and as a general matter, jury trials were not conducted in the
bankruptcy courts under the 1898 Act. 3 8 In an attempt to reconstruct
and expand the power of the bankruptcy courts, Congress replaced the
1898 Act with the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 (1978 Act).3 9 The
33. The constitutionality of the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal
Judgeship Act of 1984 (BAFJA), which vests the bankruptcy courts with their
authority, has itself been seriously questioned by commentators. See Ferriell,
supra note 3, at 110. This Note assumes that the BAFJA is constitutional. For a
complete discussion of the constitutionality of the BAFJA, see Ferriell, supra
note 4, at 110.
34. See 28 U.S.C. § 151 (1988). Section 151, titled "Designation of bank-
ruptcy courts," states:
In each judicial district, the bankruptcy judges in regular active ser-
vice shall constitute a unit of the district court to be known as the bank-
ruptcy court for that district. Each bankruptcy judge, as a judicial
officer of the district court, may exercise the authority conferred under
this chapter with respect to any action, suit, or proceeding and may
preside alone and hold a regular or special session of the court, except
as otherwise provided by law or by rule or order of the district court.
Id.;see also In re United Mo. Bank, 901 F.2d 1449, 1451-52 (8th Cir. 1990) ("Arti-
cle I courts are courts of special jurisdiction created by Congress ....").
35. Plastiras v. Idell (In re Sequoia Auto Brokers, Ltd.), 827 F.2d 1281,
1284 (9th Cir. 1987) ("Congress vests bankruptcy courts with their jurisdiction
and their authority has no 'inherent' source."); Taxel v. Marine Midland Busi-
ness Loans, Inc. (In re Palomar Elec. Supply, Inc.), 138 B.R. 959, 963 (S.D. Cal.
1992) ("[B]ankruptcy court judges cannot conduct jury trials ...unless they
have a statutory basis for such authority.").
36. See, e.g., United Missouri, 901 F.2d at 1453-57 (analyzing whether BAFJA
expressly or impliedly granted authority to bankruptcy courts to conduct jury
trials); Sequoia Auto Brokers, 827 F.2d at 1283-85 (analyzing whether bankruptcy
courts have express or implied authority to exercise civil contempt powers).
37. Act of July 1, 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544; United Missouri, 901 F.2d at
1452. For a thorough discussion of the history of bankruptcy jurisdiction, see
Ferriell, supra note 4, at 113-21.
38. United Missouri, 901 F.2d at 1452. The United Missouri court did note
that there were two narrow statutory exceptions that provided for jury trials in
bankruptcy courts under the 1898 Act. Id. These two exceptions involved "in-
voluntary petitions and the dischargeability of debts." Id.
39. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549.
7
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1978 Act did not contain an express grant of power to bankruptcy courts
to empaneljuries. 40 Because of the expansive language chosen by Con-
gress, however, courts interpreted the 1978 Act to include this grant of
power to bankruptcy courts to conduct jury trials on the basis of con-
gressional intent.4 ' This interpretation was rendered moot when in
1982, the United States Supreme Court held in Northern Pipeline Construc-
tion Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 42 that the 1978 Act was unconstitu-
tional as violative of the separation of powers doctrine. 43 As a response
to the Supreme Court's invalidation of the 1978 Act, the Administrative
Office of the United States Courts drafted the Emergency Rule as a tem-
porary replacement for the 1978 Act.44 The Emergency Rule expressly
forbade jury trials in bankruptcy courts.
4 5
Subsequent to the installment of the Emergency Rule, Congress en-
acted the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act (BAFJA)
in 1984.46 The BAFJA is the current statute that confers power on the
bankruptcy courts.4 7 Pursuant to the BAFJA, bankruptcy courts func-
40. See 28 U.S.C. § 1480 (1982); United Missouri, 901 F.2d at 1452 (noting
that "section 1480 did not expressly provide authority for bankruptcy judges to
conduct jury trials").
41. United Missouri, 901 F.2d at 1453 (stating that "it is apparent from the
extremely broad grant of jurisdiction and the legislative history that Congress
intended bankruptcy courts exercise" power to conduct jury trials); Walsh v.
Long Beach Honda (In re Gaildeen Indus.), 59 B.R. 402, 404 (N.D. Cal. 1986)
(noting that 1978 Act "was generally interpreted as expressing a Congressional
intent to allow bankruptcy judges to hold jury trials"); cf. Northern Pipeline
Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 55 (1982) (noting that enu-
merated powers of bankruptcy court included "the power to hold jury trials").
42. 458 U.S. 50, 87 (1982).
43. Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 87. The Court found the 1978 Act uncon-
stitutional for reasons not directly related to the jury trial issue. For a discussion
of the Court's invalidation of the 1978 Act, see infra notes 125-46 and accompa-
nying text.
44. Memorandum of William E. Foley, Director, Administrative Office of
the United States Courts [hereinafter Emergency Rule] reprinted in 1 COLLIER ON
BANKRUvrcy 3.01 (1) (b)(vi) (15th ed. 1988). For an analysis of the Emergency
Rule, see Ferriell, supra note 4, at 118-21.
45. See Emergency Rule, supra note 44, at § (d)(1)(D). Section (d)(1) of the
emergency rule states:
(I) The bankruptcy judges may perform in referred bankruptcy cases
and proceedings all acts and duties necessary for the handling of those
cases and proceedings except that the bankruptcy judges may not
conduct:
(D) jury trials.
Those matters which may not be performed by a bankruptcy judge shall
be transferred to a district judge.
Id.
46. Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L.
No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333.
47. Id.; In re United Mo. Bank, 901 F.2d 1449, 1453 (8th Cir. 1990). Be-
cause the Emergency Rule expressly forbade jury trials, it is important to note
that the BAFJA was enacted to replace, not supplement, the Emergency Rule.
8
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tion as adjuncts of the district courts.4 8 As a result, district courts have
substantial authority over bankruptcy courts. For example, district
courts have the authority to grant or deny bankruptcy courts the power
to preside over cases.4 9 District courts also have the authority to recall
cases from bankruptcy courts at any stage in a bankruptcy proceeding.
5 0
The BAFJA creates a distinction between "core proceedings" and
"non-core proceedings."''5 In core proceedings, bankruptcy courts
have the power to "hear and determine" the facts in cases. 52 The dis-
trict courts are vested with the power to review bankruptcy court deci-
sions.5 3 However, in reviewing decisions involving core proceedings,
district courts are required follow the same rules of judicial review as
appellate courts.54 Congress has expressly designated certain matters
as "core" under the BAFJA. 55 These matters include fraudulent trans-
fer cases and preferential payments.
56
In non-core proceedings, bankruptcy courts only have the power to
make recommendations of findings of fact and conclusions of law to the
district courts. 57 These findings and conclusions are subject to de novo
See Walsh v. Long Beach Honda (In re Gaildeen Indus.), 59 B.R. 402, 404 n.4
(N.D. Cal. 1986) (noting that "it is clear that the Emergency Rule was super-
seded by the 1984 statutory amendments and, therefore, is no longer
controlling").
48. See 28 U.S.C. § 151. Section 151 states that "[i]n each judicial district,
the bankruptcy judges in regular active service shall constitute a unit of the dis-
trict court to be known as the bankruptcy court for that district." Id.
49. Id. § 157. Section 157(a) states: "Each district court may provide that
any or all cases under title 11 and any or all proceedings arising under title 11 or
arising in or related to a case under title 11 shall be referred to the bankruptcy
judges for the district." Id. (emphasis added).
50. See id. § 157(d). Section 157(d) states: "The district court may with-
draw, in whole or in part, any case or proceeding referred under this section, on
its own motion or on timely motion of any party, for cause shown." Id.
51. Id. § 157(b). When Congress is silent on the issue, the bankruptcy
judge determines whether a matter is a core or non-core proceeding. Id.
§ 157(b)(3). Section 157(b)(3) states: "The bankruptcy judge shall determine,
on the judge's own motion or on timely motion of a party, whether a proceeding
is a core proceeding under this subsection or is a proceeding that is otherwise
related to a case under title 11." Id.
52. See id. § 157(b)(1). Section 157(b)(1) states: "Bankruptcy judges may
hear and determine all cases under title 11 and all core proceedings arising
under title 11, or arising in a case under title 11 ... and may enter appropriate
orders and judgments, subject to review under section 158 of this title." Id.
53. See id. § 158(c).
54. Id. Section 158(c) states that "[a]n appeal.., shall be taken in the same
manner as appeals in civil proceedings generally are taken to the courts of ap-
peals from the district courts." Id.
55. Id. § 157(b)(2).
56. Id. Section 157(b)(2) expressly states: "Core proceedings include, but
are not limited to ... proceedings to determine, avoid, or recover preferences
[and] ... proceedings to determine, avoid, or recover fraudulent conveyances
.... Id.
57. Id. § 157(c)(1). Section 157(c)(1) states that in non-core proceedings,
9
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review by the district courts, unless the parties consent to allow the
bankruptcy judge to make a final determination of the matter. 58
No language in the BAFJA expressly addresses the issue of whether
bankruptcy courts have the power to conduct jury trials in core proceed-
ings or non-core proceedings. 59 In fact, only section 1411 of the BAFJA
expressly discusses jury trials. 60 That section reserves the right to ajury
trial for personal injury and wrongful death claims; it does not, however,
address the right to jury trials in bankruptcy courts. 6 ' Thus, courts and
commentators have generally recognized that the BAFJA contains no
express grant of authority to bankruptcy courts to conduct jury trials.
62
the bankruptcy judge shall submit proposed findings of fact and conclu-
sions of law to the district court, and any final order or judgment shall
be entered by the district judge after considering the bankruptcy
judge's proposed findings and conclusions and after reviewing de novo
those matters to which any party has timely and specifically objected.
Id.
58. Id. § 157(c). If the parties consent to allow the bankruptcy judge to
make a final determination of a non-core matter pursuant to § 157(c)(2), the
case, for purposes of appeal, is treated the same as if the case were a core pro-
ceeding. Id. § 157(c)(2). Section 157(c)(2) specifically states:
Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph (1) of this subsection, the
district court, with the consent of all the parties to the proceeding, may
refer a proceeding related to a case under title 11 to a bankruptcy judge
to hear and determine and to enter appropriate orders and judgments,
subject to review under section 158 of this title.
Id. For the text of § 157(c)(1), see supra note 57.
59. Gumport v. Growth Fin. Corp. (In re Transcon Lines), 121 B.R. 837,
841 (C.D. Cal. 1990) (noting that BAFJA "does not contain any specific or ex-
press authority granting a bankruptcy judge the power or authority to conduct
jury trials").
60. See 28 U.S.C. § 1411 (1988) (reserving right to jury trial for personal
injury and wrongful death claims). For the text of § 1411, see infra note 61..
61. 28 U.S.C. § 1411. Section 1411, entitled "Jury trials," states: "Except
as provided in subsection (b) of this section, this chapter and title 11 do not
affect any right to trial by jury that an individual has under applicable nonban-
kruptcy law with regard to a personal injury or wrongful death tort claim." Id.
§ 1411 (a). Therefore, under this section, if a personal injury or wrongful death
claim was referred to a bankruptcy court and the right to a jury trial was extin-
guished as a result, this section would preserve the right to a jury trial.
62. Rafoth v. National Union Fire Ins. Co. (In re Baker & Getty Fin. Servs.,
Inc.), 954 F.2d 1169, 1173 (6th Cir. 1992) ("[N]o statutory language supports
jury trials in the bankruptcy courts."); In re United Mo. Bank, 901 F.2d 1449,
1454 (8th Cir. 1990) (same); Ben Cooper, Inc. v. Insurance Co. (In re Ben
Cooper, Inc.), 896 F.2d 1394, 1402 (2d Cir.) (same), vacated and remanded, 111 S.
Ct. 425, reinstated, 924 F.2d 36 (2d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2041 (1991);
Taxel v. Marine Midland Business Loans, Inc. (In re Palomar Elec. Supply, Inc.),
138 B.R. 959, 962 (S.D. Cal. 1992) (same); Citicorp N. Am., Inc. v. Finley (In re
Washington Mfg. Co.), 133 B.R. 113, 118 (M.D. Tenn. 1991) (same); Torcise v.
Community Bank, 131 B.R. 503, 506 (S.D. Fla. 1991) (same); Growers Packing
Co. v. Community Bank, 134 B.R. 438, 442 (S.D. Fla. 1991) (same); Walsh v.
California Commerce Bank (In re Interbank Mortgage Corp.), 128 B.R. 269, 272
(N.D. Cal. 1991) (same); Gumport v. Growth Fin. Corp. (In re Transcon Lines),
121 B.R. 837, 841-42 (C.D. Cal. 1990) (same); Leonard v. Wessel (In reJackson),
118 B.R. 243, 250 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (same); McCormick v. American Investors
10
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While a statute may not contain an express grant of authority, fed-
eral courts recognize that in limited circumstances power may be im-
plied from a statute based on congressional intent. 63 For example,
under the 1978 Act, prior to its invalidation, federal courts implied the
authority for bankruptcy courts to conduct jury trials. 64 When interpret-
ing the BAFJA, however, federal courts have debated over whether the
BAFJA contains a similar implied grant of authority.
6 5
B. The Constitutionality Requirement for Congressional Grants of Authority to
Bankruptcy Courts
In addition to statutory limitations on bankruptcy courts' authority,
the United States Constitution limits the power that Congress may con-
fer on bankruptcy courts. 66 Thus, although Congress has statutorily
granted certain power to bankruptcy courts, if the exercise of that power
exceeds the limitations set by the Constitution, then the grant of power
is unconstitutional and invalid. 67 Article III and the Seventh Amend-
Management, Inc. (In re McCormick), 67 B.R. 838, 841 (D. Nev. 1986) (same); S.
Elizabeth Gibson, Jury Trials and Core Proceedings: The Bankruptcy Judge's Uncertain
Authority, 65 AM. BANKR. L.J. 143, 151 (Winter 1991) [hereinafter Gibson, Jury
Trials] (recognizing "lack of express statutory authority for bankruptcy judges to
conduct jury trials"); Anthony M. Sabino,Jury Trials, Bankruptcy Judges, and Article
III: The Constitutional Crisis of the Bankruptcy Court, 21 SETON HALL L. REV. 258,
304 (1991) (finding no statutory basis for power of bankruptcy courts to conduct
jury trials).
63. See, e.g., Ben Cooper, 896 F.2d at 1402-03 (finding implied authority for
bankruptcy courts to conduct jury trials). The rule of construction followed by
the federal courts to determine whether the power in question is within the in-
tent of Congress when enacting a statute is to first examine the statutory lan-
guage of the act., Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 896 (1984) (examining intent
of Congress concerning award of attorney's fees under § 1988 of Civil Rights
Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1988)); Plastiras v. Idell
(In re Sequoia Auto Brokers, Ltd.), 827 F.2d 1281, 1284-85 (9th Cir. 1987) (ex-
amining whether court could infer from BAFJA civil contempt powers). If the
statutory language is unpersuasive in determining the intent of Congress, then
the federal courts examine the legislative history for an indication of congres-
sional intent. Blum, 465 U.S. at 896-97 (examining legislative history of section
1988 to determine intent of Congress); Sequoia Auto Brokers, 827 F.2d at 1285
("When the meaning of statutory language is unclear, we consider legislative
history to assist in interpretation.").
64. United Missouri, 901 F.2d at 1452-53. For a more expansive list of courts
that have implied the authority of bankruptcy courts to conduct jury trials under
the 1978 Act, see supra note 41.
65. For a list of cases that reflect the debate among federal courts, see supra
note 2.
66. United Missouri, 901 F.2d at 1452 (noting that power of bankruptcy
courts is limited by Constitution); Ben Cooper, 896 F.2d at 1403-04 (examining
whether jury trials in bankruptcy courts are permissible under Constitution).
67. See Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S.
50, 87 (1982) (finding grant of authority under 1978 Act unconstitutional be-
cause it vested bankruptcy courts with power of Article III courts in violation of
Article III of Constitution).
11
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ment of the Constitution both present considerable limitations on the
authority that Congress may vest in bankruptcy courts.68 This section of
this Note examines these limitations on Congress and, more specifically,
the constitutionality of granting bankruptcy courts the authority to con-
duct jury trials under the Seventh Amendment and Article III.
1. The Relationship Between the Seventh Amendment and Jury Trials in
Bankruptcy Courts
The Seventh Amendment guarantees the right to a jury trial "[i]n
[s]uits at common law."'6 9 Shortly after the enactment of the BAFJA in
1984, an issue arose in the federal courts over whether cases referred to
bankruptcy courts were "suits at common law," implicating a Seventh
Amendment jury trial guarantee. 70 The United States Supreme Court
addressed this issue in Granfinanciera, S. A. v. Nordberg.
7 1
a. The Granfinanciera Case
In Granfinanciera, the trustee for Chase & Sanborn Corporation
(Chase), which had filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy, brought construc-
tive fraud and actual fraud actions against Granfinanciera, S. A.
(Granfinanciera) and Medex, Ltda. (Medex) in the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Florida. 72 The proceedings were re-
ferred to a bankruptcy court. 73 The trustee alleged that Granfinanciera
and Medex had received $1.7 million in payments within one year of the
68. See, e.g., Ben Cooper, 896 F.2d at 1403-04 (analyzing constitutionality of
jury trials in bankruptcy courts under Article III and Seventh Amendment); see
also Gibson, Juy Trials, supra note 62, at 163-68 (noting violation of Seventh
Amendment and Article III if power is given to bankruptcy judges to preside
over juries).
69. U.S. CONST. amend. VII. The Seventh Amendment to the United States
Constitution states: "In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy
shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no
fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United
States, than according to the rules of the common law." Id.
70. See, e.g., Ben Cooper, 896 F.2d at 1402-03 (examining relation between
Seventh Amendment and jury trials in bankruptcy courts). Most courts have
held that when a case is referred to a bankruptcy court there is no right to ajury
trial, even though a right would have existed had the case remained in the dis-
trict court. See, e.g., Baldwin-United Corp. v. Thompson (In re Baldwin-United
Corp.), 48 B.R. 49, 56 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1985); see also Lawrence P. King,Juris-
diction and Procedure Under the Bankruptcy Amendments of 1984, 38 VAND. L. REV.
675, 703-04 (1985) ("The bankruptcy court is a court of equity, in which there is
no right of trial by jury.").
71. 492 U.S.33, 36 (1989). For a complete discussion of the Granfinanciera
decision and an analysis of the effect of that decision on the authority of the
bankruptcy courts, see G. Ray Warner, Rotten to the "Core". An Essay on Juries,
Jurisdiction and Granfinanciera, 59 UMKC L. REV. 991 (1991).
72. Granfinanciera, 492 U.S. at 36. Chase voluntarily filed for a Chapter 11
reorganization in 1983. Id. The United States Bankruptcy Court for the South-
ern District of Florida appointed a bankruptcy trustee for Chase. Id.
73. Id.
12
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commencement of Chapter 11 proceedings without giving consideration
in return.74 Granfinanciera and Medex requested a jury trial.75 The
bankruptcy court held that the defendants had no right to a jury trial in
bankruptcy court.7 6 The bankruptcy court dismissed the actual fraud
claim and entered judgment for the trustee on the constructive fraud
claim. 77 The District Court for the Southern District of Florida affirmed
the bankruptcy court's decision. 78 The Court of Appeals for the Elev-
enth Circuit also affirmed, holding that fraudulent conveyances were
core proceedings that were equitable in nature, and, therefore, no right
to a jury trial attached.
79
On appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States, the Court
narrowly framed the issue as: "[W]hether a person who has not submit-
ted a claim against a bankruptcy estate has a right to a jury trial when
sued by the trustee in bankruptcy to recover an allegedly fraudulent
monetary transfer."8 0
The Granfinanciera Court addressed what types of actions invoked
the Seventh Amendment guarantee to a jury trial.8 1 The Court noted
that the clause of the Seventh Amendment that grants the right to ajury
trial restricts that right to "[sluits at common law."'8 2 The Court ob-
served that federal courts have interpreted this restriction to mean that
the Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial attached only to "suits in
which legal rights [are] to be ascertained and determined," as opposed to
suits in which equitable rights are involved.8 3 The Court further stated
that the determination of whether a statutory right is a legal right de-
pends on two factors.8 4 The first is whether the action is the type of
action to which a common law right to ajury trial would have attached in
the Eighteenth Century.8 5 The second and more important factor is
74. Id.
75. Id. at 37.
76. Id.
77. Id. The judgment on the constructive fraud claim was for $1,500,000
against Granfinanciera and $180,000 against Medex. Id.
78. Id.
79. Nordberg v. Granfinanciera, S.A. (In re Chase & Sanborn Corp.), 835
F.2d 1341, 1349-50 (l1th Cir. 1988), rev'd, 492 U.S. 33 (1989). The Eleventh
Circuit further supported its reasoning by noting that the bankruptcy courts are
courts of equity and, therefore, a right to a jury trial did not exist. Id. at 1348-
49.
80. Granfinanciera, 492 U.S. at 36.
81. Id. at 40-42.
82. Id. at 41 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. VII).
83. Id. (quoting Parsons v. Bedford, 3 Pet. 433, 447 (1830)). The Court
distinguished suits involving legal rights from " 'those where equitable rights
[are] recognized, and equitable remedies' " are granted. Id. (quoting Parsons v.
Bedford, 3 Pet. 433, 477 (1830)). For a further discussion of the law-equity dis-
tinction, see Warner, supra note 71, at 998-1000.
84. Granfinanciera, 492 U.S. at 42.
85. Id.; see also Conrad K. Cyr, The Right to Trial by Juy in Bankruptcy: Which
Judge is to Preside?, 63 AM. BANKR. L.J. 53, 53-54 (1989) (noting historical analysis
1993] NOTE 215
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whether the remedy available from the cause of action is essentially a
legal or an equitable remedy. 86 The Court concluded that by evaluating
these two factors, a court will be able to determine whether an action is
legal or equitable.
8 7
The Granfinanciera Court examined another labeling distinction it
found influential on the jury trial issue: the distinction between "public
rights" and "private rights." 88 The Court stated that the Seventh
Amendment is not implicated in public rights cases, even where a legal
claim is asserted.8 9 Congress may extinguish the right to a jury trial in
legal claims in which public rights are asserted by assigning those claims
to administrative bodies that do not utilize juries.90 The Court noted,
however, that in cases of private rights involving legal claims, the Sev-
enth Amendment right to a jury trial does attach. 9 1 The Court warned
that Congress may not circumvent the Seventh Amendment right to a
jury trial in legal claims involving private rights by delegating the cause
of action to an administrative body where facts are not determined by a
jury.
9 2
In applying these considerations to the case, the Court concluded
that fraudulent conveyances were private rights. 93 The Court also con-
involved in determining whether Seventh Amendment right to jury trial attaches
to newly created cause of action).
86. Granfinanciera, 492 U.S. at 42 (noting that "second stage of... analysis
is more important than the first").
87. Id.
88. Id. at 51. The Court defined "private" and "public rights" in a foot-
note. See id. at 51 n.8. The Court relied on Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 50-
51 (1932), where the Court defined " 'private right[s]' as 'the liability of one
individual to another under the law as defined,' . . . in contrast to cases that
'arise between the Government and persons subject to its authority in connec-
tion with the performance of the constitutional functions of the executive or
legislative departments.' " Granfinanciera, 492 U.S. at 51 n.8 (quoting Crowell,
285 U.S. at 50-51). The Granfinanciera Court gave an example of "public rights"
as rights "'where the Government is involved in its sovereign capacity under an
otherwise valid statute creating enforceable public rights.' " Id. at 51 (quoting
Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Comm'n, 430 U.S.
442, 458 (1977)). Examples the Court gave of traditional private rights were:
"wholly private tort, contract, and property cases." Id. (quoting Atlas Roofing
Co. v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Comm'n, 430 U.S. 442, 458
(1977)).
89. Granfinanciera, 492 U.S. at 42 n.4, 51. The Court stated that "[t]he Sev-
enth Amendment protects a litigant's right to a jury trial only if a cause of action
is legal in nature and it involves a matter of 'private right.' " Id. at 42 n.4.
90. Id. at 42 n.4, 51.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 52.
93. Id. at 55 (noting that "a bankruptcy trustee's right to recover a fraudu-
lent conveyance under 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(2) seems to us more accurately char-
acterized as a private rather than a public right"). The Court noted that "state-
law causes of action for breach of contract or warranty are paradigmatic private
rights." Id. at 56. The Court then reasoned that "fraudulent conveyance actions
by bankruptcy trustees ... are quintessentially suits at common law that more
216 [Vol. 38: p. 203
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cluded that fraudulent conveyance actions were actions at law and not
equity because of their roots in Eighteenth Century common law and
because of the nature of their remedies. 94 The Court thus held that the
designation of a fraudulent conveyance action as a "core proceeding"
under the BAFJA could not extinguish Granfinanciera and Medex's right
to a jury trial.
9 5
After Granfinanciera, it is clear that a Seventh Amendment right to a
jury trial exists in private rights cases when a legal claim is asserted.
9 6
Thus interpreted, the Seventh Amendment would grant a right to ajury
trial in a limited number of cases that are now within the bankruptcy
courts' jurisdiction under the BAFJA, including claims of fraudulent
nearly resemble state-law contract claims brought by a bankrupt corporation to
augment the bankruptcy estate than they do creditors' hierarchically ordered
claims to a pro rata share of the bankruptcy res." Id. Therefore, the Court de-
termined that the right asserted in the fraudulent conveyance action in
Granfinanciera was a "private right." Id. The Court also intimated that actions
for preferential payments would fall into the same class as fraudulent transfers.
Id. at 58 & n.13. The Court, however, did indicate that some preferential trans-
fers could be distinguishable, stating that "in some cases preference avoidance
actions are equitable in character." Id. at 58 n.13.
94. Id. at 49. The Court analyzed how fraudulent conveyances were han-
dled at common law. Id. at 43-47. The Court concluded that under Eighteenth
Century common law, the claim before the Court in Granfinanciera would have
been under the mandatory jurisdiction of courts of law. Id. at 46-47. Further-
more, the Court found that the remedies available in fraudulent transfer claims
were primarily remedies of law, not equity. Id. at 47-49.
95. Id. at 64. The Court left unanswered several critical questions concern-
ing what forum was appropriate for the jury trial, and the problems created if the
forum chosen would be a bankruptcy court. Id. at 50. The Court expressly lim-
ited its holding to avoid these issues. Id. The Court stated:
We are not obliged to decide today whether bankruptcy courts may
conduct jury trials in fraudulent conveyance suits brought by a trustee
against a person who has not entered a claim against the estate, either
in the rare procedural posture of this case .. .or under the current
statutory scheme .... Nor need we decide whether, if Congress has
authorized bankruptcy courts to hold jury trials in such actions, that
authorization comports with Article III when non-Article III judges
preside over the actions subject to review in, or withdrawal by, the dis-
trict courts. We also need not consider whether jury trials conducted
by a bankruptcy court would satisfy the Seventh Amendment's com-
mand that "no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in
any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the com-
mon law," given that district courts may presently set aside clearly erro-
neous factual findings by bankruptcy courts.
Id.
96. See Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Frates (In re Kaiser Steel Corp.), 911 F.2d 380,
388-89 (10th Cir. 1990) (finding that Seventh Amendment right to jury trial still
existed in action referred to bankruptcy court); In re United Mo. Bank, 901 F.2d
1449, 1451 (8th Cir. 1990) (same); Ben Cooper, Inc. v. Insurance Co. of Pa. (In
re Ben Cooper, Inc.), 896 F.2d 1394, 1400-02 (2d Cir.) (same); vacated and re-
manded, 111 S. Ct. 425, reinstated, 924 F.2d 36 (2d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S.
Ct. 2041 (1991). For a further discussion of the Seventh Amendment right to
jury trials in legal claims involving private rights, see supra notes 81-95 and ac-
companying text.
15
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payment.97 However, even assuming Congress expressly grants bank-
ruptcy courts the authority to conduct jury trials in these limited types of
cases, two Seventh Amendment concerns still exist: whether a jury trial
in the bankruptcy courts satisfies the jury trial requirement of the Sev-
enth Amendment and whether a jury trial in the bankruptcy courts
would create Seventh Amendment problems concerning judicial
review.
98
b. The Jury Trial Requirement of the Seventh Amendment
The first Seventh Amendment concern regarding jury trials in bank-
ruptcy courts is whether the Seventh Amendment guarantee to a jury
trial is satisfied by a jury trial conducted in a bankruptcy court.99 Some
litigants have argued that to satisfy the Seventh Amendment, ajury trial
must be conducted by an Article III judge, which bankruptcy judges are
not. 100
An example of how a court has resolved this Seventh Amendment
issue is the decision of the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania in Leonard v. Wessel (In reJackson). 0 1 Jackson in-
volved actions by a bankruptcy trustee against the attorneys of the
debtor under both tort and contract theories.' 0 2 After determining that
the actions were core proceedings under the BAFJA, the Jackson court
found an implied statutory power in bankruptcy courts to conduct jury
trials.' 0 3 On the Seventh Amendment issue, the Jackson court concluded
that a jury trial in a bankruptcy court satisfied the Seventh Amend-
97. See Granfinanciera, 492 U.S. at 64.
98. For a discussion of the two Seventh Amendment complications, see in-
fra notes 99-118 and accompanying text.
99. Leonard v. Wessel (In re Jackson), 118 B.R. 243, 253 (E.D. Pa. 1990)
(addressing whetherjury trial in bankruptcy court would satisfy Seventh Amend-
ment guarantee); Cyr, supra note 85, at 59-60. As Cyr notes, the substance of the
Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial includes,
a jury trial presided over by a judge with authority to rule on questions
of law, to aid the jury by explaining and commenting on the evidence,
to direct a verdict when there is no substantial issue of fact for the jury,
and to set aside the verdict if it is against the law or the weight of the
evidence.
Id. at 54. For a thorough discussion of the relation between jury trials in bank-
ruptcy courts and the Seventh Amendment guarantee to ajury trial, see S. Eliza-
beth Gibson, Jury Trials in Bankruptcy: Obeying the Commands of Article III and the
Seventh Amendment, 72 MINN. L. REV. 967, 1034-38 (1988) [hereinafter Gibson,
Obeying Article III].
100. See, e.g.,Jackson, 118 B.R. at 253.
101. 118 B.R. 243 (E.D. Pa. 1990).
102. Id. at 244.
103. Id. at 248, 252 (determining that federal courts should give bank-
ruptcy courts power to conduct jury trials in interest of administration of
justice).
16
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ment. 10 4 In support of this conclusion, the Jackson court commented
that non-Article III judges have presided over jury trial cases in the past
and that these cases have always satisfied the Seventh Amendment
guarantee. '
0 5
The Jackson decision is congruent with commentators that have ad-
dressed the issue.10 6 Thus, under the Jackson theory, a jury trial con-
ducted in a bankruptcy court would satisfy a Seventh Amendment
request for a jury trial.
c. Judicial Review of Jury Decisions
The second Seventh Amendment concern regarding jury trials in
bankruptcy courts is whether the system ofjudicial review of bankruptcy
decisions established by the BAFJA creates a Seventh Amendment bar-
rier to permiting jury trials in bankruptcy courts. 10 7 The BAFJA pro-
vides a system of review for core and non-core proceedings where the
district courts are authorized to review the decisions of bankruptcy
courts.' 0 8 In contrast, the Seventh Amendment provides that "no fact
tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the
United States."' 0 9 Therefore, in order for bankruptcy courts to consti-
tutionally conduct jury trials, the BAFJA system of review must not vio-
late the Re-examination Clause of the Seventh Amendment.
The United States Courts of Appeals for the Third and Ninth Cir-
cuits addressed the problem of compatibility between the Seventh
Amendment and the BAFJA's judicial review provisions.I 10 The cases
104. Id. at 253. The defendants argued that an Article III judge was re-
quired to preside over the jury trial to satisfy the Seventh Amendment. Id.
105. Id. Judge Pollak in Jackson stated: "We have had non-Article III courts
administering federal justice with juries for the major part of our history. The
sufficiency, for Seventh Amendment purposes, of ajury in a non-Article III court
has never, so far as I know, been brought into serious question." Id.; see also
Gibson,Jury Trials, supra note 62, at 163-64. Gibson notes that other non-Article
III courts conduct jury trials that satisfy the Seventh Amendment. Id. For exam-
ple, the courts of the District of Columbia have conducted jury trials without
Article III powers. Id. at 164.
106. See, e.g., In re Grabill Corp., 967 F.2d 1152, 1160 (7th Cir. 1992) (Pos-
ner, J., dissenting) (finding bankruptcy judges competent to preside over jury
trials); Gibson,Jury Trials, supra note 62, at 163-65 (determining that jury trials
conducted in core proceedings by bankruptcy judges would satisfy Seventh
Amendment guarantee); Gibson, Obeying Article III, supra note 99, at 1038 ("The
seventh amendment ... appears to pose no constitutional obstacle to jury trials
conducted by bankruptcy judges.").
107. Ben Cooper, Inc. v. Insurance Co. of Pa. (In re Ben Cooper, Inc.), 896
F.2d 1394, 1403 (2d Cir.) (addressing problem of judicial review when bank-
ruptcy courts conduct jury trials), vacated and remanded, 111 S. Ct. 425, reinstated,
924 F.2d 36 (2d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2041 (1991); Cyr, supra note
85, at 60-61 (same); Gibson,Jury Trials, supra note 62, at 164-65 (same); Gibson,
Obeying Article III, supra note 99, at 1045-48 (same).
108. See 28 U.S.C. § 158 (1988).
109. U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
110. Taxel v. Electronic Sports Research (In re Cinematronics, Inc.), 916
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before the Third and Ninth Circuits both dealt with non-core proceedings
in which the parties had not consented to allow the bankruptcy judge to
make a final determination. " I Both the Third and Ninth Circuits recog-
nized that pursuant to section 157 of the BAFJA, district courts have the
power to conduct de novo review of non-core proceedings." 2 The Third
and Ninth Circuits determined that if a jury trial was conducted on a
non-core matter, the BAFJA would permit the district court to re-ex-
amine factual determinations made by the jury."13 Thus, to avoid a con-
flict between the BAFJA, which authorizes judicial review of factual
findings, and the Seventh Amendment, which prohibits such review,
both circuit courts held that the Seventh Amendment prevented bank-
ruptcy courts from conducting jury trials in non-core proceedings." 14
The problem addressed by the Third and the Ninth Circuits, how-
ever, is not implicated in core proceedings or proceedings in which the
parties have consented to allow the bankruptcy court to make all final
determinations." 5 In upholdingjury trials in bankruptcy courts against
F.2d 1444, 1450-51 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that jury trials in bankruptcy courts
were incompatible with Seventh Amendment in non-core proceedings); Beard v.
Braunstein, 914 F.2d 434, 442-43 (3d Cir. 1990) (same).
111. Cinematronics, 916 F.2d at 1450 (finding that state law claim against
company chief executive officer for post-petition misconduct was non-core pro-
ceeding); Beard, 914 F.2d at 445 (finding that action by bankruptcy trustee to
recover pre-petition and post-petition rents from debtor's tenant was non-core
proceeding).
112. Cinematronics, 916 F.2d at 1451; Beard, 914 F.2d at 443.
113. Cf. Cinematronics, 916 F.2d at 1451; Beard, 914 F.2d at 443; see also Gib-
sonJury Trials, supra note 62, at 164 (noting that in non-core proceedings, dis-
trict court could review findings by bankruptcy court jury).
114. Cinematronics, 916 F.2d at 1451 (finding that "grave Seventh Amend-
ment problems would arise if ajury trial is conducted by the bankruptcy court");
Beard, 914 F.2d at 443 (finding that because of Seventh Amendment judicial re-
view problems, "a bankruptcy court cannot conduct a jury trial in a non-core
proceeding"); see also Ben Cooper, Inc. v. Insurance Co. of Pa. (In re Ben
Cooper, Inc.), 896 F.2d 1394, 1403 (2d Cir.), vacated and remanded, 111 S. Ct.
425, reinstated, 924 F.2d 36 (2d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2041 (1991);
American Community Servs., Inc. v. Wright Mktg., Inc. (In re American Commu-
nity Servs., Inc.), 86 B.R. 681, 689 (D. Utah 1988) (disallowingjury trials in non-
core proceedings in bankruptcy court without consent of parties because of Sev-
enth Amendment judicial review problems); Douglas G. Baird, Jury Trials After
Granfinanciera, 65 AM. BANKR. L.J. 1, 11-12 (1991) (noting Seventh Amendment
problem when district court reviews de novo findings ofjury in bankruptcy court
in core proceedings); Gibson,Jury Trials, supra note 62, at 164 ("U]ury trials of
noncore proceedings may not be conducted in the bankruptcy court under the
current jurisdictional scheme that allows de novo review by the district court.");
Gibson, Obeying Article III, supra note 99, at 1048 ("[D]e novo review required by
the statute would violate the seventh amendment's reexamination clause.").
115. Ben Cooper, 896 F.2d at 1403 (holding thatjudicial review in core pro-
ceedings does not violate Seventh Amendment); Walsh v. California Commerce
Bank (In re Interbank Mortgage Corp.), 128 B.R. 269, 272 (N.D. Cal. 1991)
(same); McCormick v. American Investors Management, Inc. (In re McCormick),
67 B.R. 838, 843 (D. Nev. 1986) (finding that in non-core proceedings where
parties consent, bankruptcy courts may conductjury trials without contravening
18
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a Seventh Amendment attack, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit in Ben Cooper, Inc. v. Insurance Co. of Pennsylvania (In re
Ben Cooper) 1 6 stated that in core and consensual proceedings, the dis-
trict court reviews the bankruptcy court decision only as an appellate
court." 17 Under the current statutory scheme, therefore, a district court
in such cases would not be permitted to re-examine the factual issues of
a jury trial, which is consistent with the Seventh Amendment." 8
As a result of the Seventh Amendment's proscription against appel-
late review of factual findings by ajury, bankruptcy courts are prevented
from conducting jury trials in non-core proceedings under the current
statutory scheme. However, this Seventh Amendment proscription does
not provide a barrier to bankruptcy courts conducting jury trials in core
proceedings. When combined with the fact that a bankruptcy judge's
status as a non-Article III judge does not prevent a jury trial conducted
by that judge from satisfying the Seventh Amendment, the Seventh
Amendment poses no restriction upon a bankruptcy judge to conduct a
jury trial in a core proceeding.
2. The Relationship Between Article III and Jury Trials in the Bankruptcy
Courts
The power of the judicial branch is derived from Article III.' 19 Sec-
tion one of Article III states that "[t]heJudges, both of the supreme and
inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour, and
shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services, a Compensation, which
shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office."' 120 In com-
parison to Article III judges, bankruptcy judges under the BAFJA are
appointed for fourteen year terms, and their salaries are subject to dimi-
nution by Congress.121 Bankruptcy judges, therefore, are not Article III
judges, and bankruptcy courts are not Article III courts. 12 2 Instead,
bankruptcy courts are characterized as Article I courts created pursuant
to Congress' authority over bankruptcy matters under Article I, section
United States Constitution); GibsonJury Trials, supra note 62, at 164-65 (noting
that judicial review problems in non-core proceedings do not apply to core
proceedings).
116. 896 F.2d 1394 (2d Cir. 1990), vacated and remanded, 111 S. Ct. 425,
reinstated, 924 F.2d 36 (2d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2041 (1991).
117. Id. at 1403 (noting that "jury verdict in a core proceeding is subject
only to the traditional standards of appellate review"); see also 28 U.S.C.
§ 158(a). For a further discussion of the Ben Cooper decision, see infra notes 163-
78 and accompanying text.
118. Ben Cooper, 896 F.2d at 1403; see also Gibson,Jury Trials, supra note 62,
at 164-65 (determining that judicial review would not pose problem in core pro-
ceedings because district court review is limited).
119. U.S. CONST. art. III.
120. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
121. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 152-53 (1988); Plastiras v. Idell (In re Sequoia Auto
Brokers, Ltd.), 827 F.2d 1281, 1284 (9th Cir. 1987).
122. Sequoia Auto Brokers, 827 F.2d at 1284.
NOTE
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eight of the Constitution.' 23 Under the separation of powers doctrine,
Congress is prohibited from granting the essential attributes of the judi-
cial branch to judges who are not appointed pursuant to Article III; such
an act would infringe on the authority of the judicial branch.' 2 4 While
Congress is thus limited in the authority that it may grant to bankruptcy
courts, the exact limits on that authority remain unclear.
The United States Supreme Court in Northern Pipeline Construction Co.
v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 125 attempted to define the limits on the power
Congress may confer to the bankruptcy courts. 126 The focus of the
Supreme Court in Northern Pipeline was on the constitutionality of the
1978 Act. 127 The case involved a suit brought by Northern Pipeline
Construction Company (Northern Pipeline) against Marathon Pipe Line
Company (Marathon) in a bankruptcy court based on breach of contract,
breach of warranty, misrepresentation, coercion and duress theories. 128
Marathon moved to dismiss the claims, asserting that the 1978 Act im-
properly granted Article III powers to "judges who lacked life tenure
and protection against salary diminution," and was, therefore, unconsti-
tutional. 129 The United States Supreme Court held the 1978 Act un-
constitutional and granted the dismissal.' 30 The Court, however,
diverged in reasoning, with four separate opinions and three justices
123. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4; Sequoia Auto Brokers, 827 F.2d at 1284.
Article I, § 8, cl. 4 states that "[t]he Congress shall have Power... [tio establish
... uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States."
U.S. CONST. Art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
124. Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50,
57-60 (1982). For an in-depth discussion of Northern Pipeline, see infra notes 125-
49 and accompanying text.
125. 458 U.S. 50 (1982). For a general discussion of the Northern Pipeline
decision, see Erwin Chemerinsky, Ending the Marathon: It Is Time to Overrule North-
ern Pipeline, 65 AM. BANKR. L.J. 311, 312 (1991) (discussing problems concerning
Northern Pipeline decision and arguing that Northern Pipeline should be overruled,
stating that "Congress [should] decide the status and jurisdiction of the bank-
ruptcy courts").
126. See Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 62-71.
127. Id. at 62.
128. Id. at 56. Northern Pipeline had filed for reorganization in January of
1980. Id. Marathon motioned for dismissal asserting that the 1978 Act con-
ferred Article III powers on a non-Article III court. Id. at 56-57. The United
States intervened to defend the statute. Id. at 57. The United States Bankruptcy
Court for the District of Minnesota refused to dismiss the case. Northern Pipe-
line Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipeline Co. (In re Northern Pipeline Constr. Co.),
6 B.R. 928, 931-32 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1980). The United States District Court for
the District of Minnesota, however, reversed the holding of the bankruptcy court
and granted the dismissal. Marathon Pipeline Co. v. Northern Pipeline Constr.
Co., 12 B.R. 946, 947 (D. Minn. 1981). The parties then appealed the case to
the United States Supreme Court. Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 57.
129. Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 56-57.
130. Id. at 87-88. The Court, however, stayed its judgment to give Con-
gress the opportunity to correct the problems with the 1978 Act. Id. at 88. For a
discussion of the subsequent history of the 1978 Act, see supra notes 39-45 and
accompanying text.
222 [Vol. 38: p. 203
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dissenting. 131
Justice Brennan, joined by three other justices, announced the plu-
rality opinion of the Court.' 32 Justice Brennan listed the extensive pow-
ers conferred upon the bankruptcy courts under the 1978 Act, including
the power to hear "suits to recover accounts," to "hear claims based on
state law as well as those based on federal law" and "to hold jury tri-
als.' 13 3 According to Justice Brennan, the conveyance of such expan-
sive powers to bankruptcy courts under the 1978 Act vested bankruptcy
courts with the powers of Article III courts. 134 Justice Brennan stated
that Article III required that the "judicial power of the United States...
be exercised by courts having the attributes prescribed in Art. III."' 135
Justice Brennan observed, however, that bankruptcy court judges were
not entrusted with the same constitutional protection as judges in Arti-
cle III courts.13 6 The bankruptcy judges do not have life-time tenure
and salary protection.13 7 In light of these considerations, Justice Bren-
nan concluded that under the 1978 Act, bankruptcy judges were not Ar-
ticle III judges.' 3 8 Having determined that bankruptcy judges were not
131. Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 92-118. The plurality was authored by
Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Marshall, Blackmun and Stevens. Id. at 52-
89. Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justice O'Connor, wrote a concurring opinion.
Id. at 89-92. Chief Justice Burger and Justice White both wrote a dissenting
opinion. Id. at 92-118. Justice White was joined by The ChiefJustice andJustice
Powell. Id. at 92-118. For a more thorough discussion of the Northern Pipeline
decision and an analysis of its presidential value, see Leonard v. Wessel (In re
Jackson), 118 B.R. 243, 245-47 (E.D. Pa. 1990).
132. Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 52-89 (Justices Marshall, Blackmun and
Stevens joined in Justice Brennan's plurality opinion).
133. Id. at 54-55. Justice Brennan stated:
Included within the bankruptcy courts' jurisdiction are suits to recover
accounts, controversies involving exempt property, actions to avoid
transfers and payments as preferences or fraudulent conveyances, and
causes of action owned by the debtor at the time of the petition for
bankruptcy. The bankruptcy courts can hear claims based on state law
as well as those based on federal law....
.... In addition to this broad grant of power, Congress has al-
lowed bankruptcy judges the power to hold juty trials, § 1480; to issue de-
claratory judgments, § 2201; to issue writs of habeas corpus under
certain circumstances, § 2256; to issue all writs necessary in aid of the
bankruptcy court's expanded jurisdiction, § 451 . . . and to issue any
order, process or judgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry out
the provisions of Title 11, 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (1976 ed., Supp. IV).
Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 54-55 (emphasis added) (citations omitted) (foot-
note omitted). Justice Brennan also recognized the appellate process created by
the 1978 Act. Id. at 55. The 1978 Act created special panels of bankruptcy
judges to hear appeals. Id.
134. Id. at 87.
135. Id. at 59.
136. Id. at 59-61. Article III sets forth the characteristics of the power en-
joyed by Article III judges. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. For the relevant text of
Article III, see text accompanying note 120.
137. Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 60-61.
138. Id. at 61.
1993] NOTE 223
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Article IIIjudges, and that the 1978 Act conferred essential attributes of
the judicial branch on bankruptcy judges, Justice Brennan concluded
that the 1978 Act violated the separation of powers doctrine, and there-
fore, was unconstitutional. 1
39
The concurrence, written by Justice Rehnquist and joined by Justice
O'Connor, restricted the plurality's opinion. 140 Justice Rehnquist did
not find the 1978 Act unconstitutional on the basis that the entire Act
violated separation of powers, as did Justice Brennan.' 4 ' Instead, Jus-
tice Rehnquist only found a portion of the 1978 Act unconstitutional. '
4 2
justice Rehnquist noted that the action before the bankruptcy court was
a private right of action, which arose solely under state law prior to the
filing of a bankruptcy petition.14 3 The only connection the state causes
of action against the defendant had with the bankruptcy court was that
139. Id. In addition to his holding, Justice Brennan expressly rejected two
arguments raised by Northern Pipeline. Id. at 62. Northern Pipeline first argued
that the bankruptcy courts were legislative courts, properly created under Arti-
cle I of the Constitution. Id. The plurality found, however, that the 1978 Act
did not fit into any of the categories of legislative courts previously recognized
by the Supreme Court. Id. at 63-64. Justice Brennan recognized the validity of
legislative courts in three narrow exceptions. Id. These exceptions, according
to Brennan, constituted narrow situations where "the grant of power to the Leg-
islative and Executive Branches was historically and constitutionally so excep-
tional that the congressional assertion of a power to create legislative courts was
consistent with, rather than threatening to, the constitutional mandate of separa-
tion of powers." Id. at 64. One of the three exceptions was the power of legisla-
tive courts to administer "public" rights. Id. at 67. Although Justice Brennan
did not fully define matters of public right, he stated that they "at a minimum
arise 'between the government and others.' " Id. at 69 (quoting Ex Parte Bakelite
Corp., 279 U.S. 438, 451 (1929)). Brennan noted in dicta that matters of public
right could be adjudicated by a legislative court, but that matters of private right
"lie at the core" ofjudicial power and must be reserved to Article III judges. Id.
at 70.
The second argument raised by Northern Pipeline and rejected by Justice
Brennan was that under the 1978 Act, district courts maintain enough control
over bankruptcy courts so that judicial power has in fact remained in Article III
courts. Id. at 76. To support its argument, Northern Pipeline analogized the
jurisdiction conferred to bankruptcy courts to that of magistrates and adminis-
trative agencies who act as adjuncts of the district courts. Id. at 67-70. Justice
Brennan found that the 1978 Act intruded too deeply into the auspice of the
Article III courts. Id. at 84. Therefore, the bankruptcy courts could not be con-
sidered adjuncts of the district court. Id.
140. Id. at 89-92 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
141. Id. at 89-90 (Rehnquist, J., concurring). Justice Rehnquist stated:
Were I to agree with the plurality that the question presented by these
cases is "whether the assignment by Congress to bankruptcy judges of
the jurisdiction granted in 28 U.S.C. § 1471 (1976 ed., Supp IV) by
§ 24 1(a) of the Bankruptcy Act of 1978 violates Art. III of the Constitu-
tion," . . . I would with considerable reluctance embark on the duty of
deciding this broad question.
Id. at 89 (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (quoting Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 52
(Brennan, J., plurality opinion).
142. Id. at 91 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
143. Id. at 90-91 (Rehnquist, J., concurring). For a discussion of the dis-
22
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 38, Iss. 1 [1993], Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol38/iss1/5
1993] NOTE 225
the plaintiff had filed for reorganization in bankruptcy court prior to
bringing the state causes of action. 144 Justice Rehnquist held that the
exercise of power by a bankruptcy court over the state private right of
action so over-extended the authority of the bankruptcy court that it vio-
lated the separation of powers doctrine.' 4 5 Justice Rehnquist then de-
termined that because the provision granting bankruptcy courts the
authority over such cases could not be severed from the 1978 Act, the
entire 1978 Act was invalid.
14 6
The broad holding in Northern Pipeline delivered by Justice Brennan,
contrasted with the narrower holding given by Justice Rehnquist has
created uncertainty as to the amount of power Congress may confer
upon a non-Article III court. 14 7 However, one constitutional interpreta-
tinction between private rights of action and public rights of action, see supra
note 88 and accompanying text.
144. Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 90-91 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
145. Id. (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
146. Id. at 90-91 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
147. See Ferriell, supra note 4, at 127-33 (noting that subsequent Supreme
Court decisions have seriously restricted Article III mandates of Northern Pipe-
line). A further Article III concern is the distinction between "private rights"
and "public rights." This distinction is raised in dicta by both the plurality opin-
ion of Northern Pipeline, and the majority opinion of Granfinanciera. See Northern
Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 67-70; Granfinanciera, S. A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 52-55
(1988). The Court in Granfinanciera determined that a Seventh Amendment
right to a jury trial is only implicated in legal actions involving "private rights."
Id. at 51-52. The plurality in Northern Pipeline, however, implied that if the litiga-
tion concerned a matter of "private right," then a non-Article III court would
not have jurisdiction. Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 70 (stating that "only contro-
versies in" public rights "category may be removed from Art. III courts and
delegated to legislative courts or administrative agencies" and that "[p]rivate-
rights disputes ... lie at the core of the historically recognized judicial power").
The plurality in Northern Pipeline would mandate that bankruptcy courts not hear
cases in which a Seventh Amendment jury trial right would arise because those
cases always involve "private rights." Under this reasoning, therefore, it would
be unconstitutional for bankruptcy courts to exercise jurisdiction over such
cases whether or not a jury trial was requested. As a result, the issue of jury
trials in bankruptcy courts where a Seventh Amendment guarantee was invoked
would be moot. However, it is important to note that Justice Rehnquist's con-
currence, did not hinge on the "public" and "private rights" distinction alone.
Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 89-92 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
The Granfinanciera Court resurrected this problem, however, when it trans-
formed the question of whether district courts could transfer actions invoking
the Seventh Amendment to non-Article III courts and remove the right to ajury
trial into the question of whether "Article III allows Congress to assign adjudica-
tion of that cause of action to a non-Article III tribunal." Granfinanciera, 492 U.S.
at 53. The Granfinanciera Court stated that if the case before the Court was not a
matter of public right Congress could not "assign its adjudication to a special-
ized non-Article III court lacking 'the essential attributes of the judicial
power.'" Id. at 53 (quoting Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 51 (1932)). A pos-
sible inference from this dicta is that matters that implicate the Seventh Amend-
ment right to a jury trial cannot be transferred to a non-Article III court. See
Torcise v. Community Bank, 131 B.R. 503, 507 (S.D. Fla. 1991) (noting that
Granfinanciera Court may dictate that an Article III court conduct jury trials when
23
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tion is clear after Northern Pipeline: Congress is limited in the amount of
power it may bestow on non-Article III courts by the separation of pow-
ers doctrine. 148 What remains unclear after Northern Pipeline, however, is
whether a grant from Congress to bankruptcy courts to conduct jury
trials conveys so much Article III power to an Article I court that the
separation of powers doctrine is violated. The answer to this question
cannot be ascertained in light of the narrowest holding of Northern Pipe-
line. 149 However, if it is constitutional for the BAFJA to authorize bank-
ruptcy courts to make final determinations in core proceedings, among
which are those proceedings implicating a Seventh Amendment right to
a jury trial, then allowing bankruptcy courts to conduct jury trials in
those cases does not appear to extend the power of bankruptcy courts so
far into the realm of Article III courts as to violate separation of powers
doctrine. 1
50
C. Circuit Court Split Regarding the Jury Trial Issue
With the statutory authority for bankruptcy courts to conduct jury
trials unclear, and with the splintered decisions of the Supreme Court in
both Granfinanciera and Northern Pipeline, it is no surprise that federal
courts have not uniformly resolved the issue of whether bankruptcy
courts are empowered to conduct jury trials.15 ' Four circuit courts prior
"private rights" are involved). Some commentators have rejected this proposi-
tion. See, e.g., Ferriell, supra note 4, at 132 (suggesting some congressionally
created "private rights" can be delegated to non-Article III forums). Such a
broad reading of the majority's opinion in Granfinanciera, however, ignores the
express limitation the Court placed on its holding. For a further discussion of
the express limitations of the Granfinanciera holding, see supra note 95. In addi-
tion, the inference ignores the fact that the Court in Granfinanciera may have only
been addressing cases where the non-Article III forum had only a non-jury fact
finder. Granfinanciera, 492 U.S. at 53. In fact, the Granfinanciera Court indicated
that it was discussing courts of equity or administrative agencies "sitting without
juries." Id.
This Note, however, assumes that the BAFJA is constitutional in all respects
other than possible provisions allowing for jury trials in bankruptcy courts.
Therefore, this Note assumes that the current framework of the BAFJA allowing
bankruptcy courts to enter final decisions in all core proceedings is
constitutional.
148. See Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 87, 91-92.
149. For a discussion of how the narrowest holding does not permit a con-
clusion that a grant of power to bankruptcy courts to conduct jury trials violates
the separation of power doctine, see supra notes 140-46. One court has deter-
mined that under the facts before it, jury trials in bankruptcy courts are not pro-
hibited by separation of powers doctrine. Ben Cooper, Inc. v. Insurance Co. of
Pa. (In re Ben Cooper, Inc.), 896 F.2d 1394, 1403-04, vacated and remanded, 111 S.
Ct. 425, reinstated, 924 F.2d 36 (2d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2041 (1991).
150. Note that other Article I courts have conducted jury trials without con-
travening the separation of powers doctrine, including magistrate courts and the
courts of the District of Columbia. See Ben Cooper, 896 F.2d at 1403.
151. For a discussion of the impact of Granfinanciera on the jury trial issue,
see supra notes 72-98 and accompanying text. For a further discussion of the
226 [Vol. 38: p. 203
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to the Seventh Circuit's decision in Grabill have addressed this issue in
the context of core proceedings. 152 Recall that core proceedings are
those proceedings in the BAFJA in which bankruptcy courts are permit-
ted to enter final decisions and in which district courts have limited judi-
cial review. 153 Three out of these four circuits have found that
bankruptcy courts are without congressional authority to empaneljuries
in core proceedings. 154 Without addressing the constitutional issues,
these three circuit courts based their conclusions on the determination
that Congress did not grant bankruptcy courts, either explicitly or im-
plicitly, the power to empanel juries in core proceedings. 15 5 By con-
trast, one circuit court has held that bankruptcy courts do have
congressional authority to empaneljuries; this court has also upheld the
constitutionality of the authority based on the facts before the court.
156
1. The Reasoning of the Majority View
The Sixth, Eighth and Tenth Circuits comprise the majority view,
which rejects finding a statutory grant of authority to bankruptcy courts
impact of the Northern Pipeline decision on the jury trial issue, see supra notes 147-
50 and accompanying text.
152. Rafoth v. National Union Fire Ins. Co. (In re Baker & Getty Fin. Servs.,
Inc.), 954 F.2d 1169, 1173 (6th Cir. 1992) (holding that bankruptcy courts lack
statutory authority to conduct jury trials in core proceedings); Kaiser Steel Corp.
v. Frates (In re Kaiser Steel Corp.), 911 F.2d 380, 392 (10th Cir. 1990) (same); In
re United Mo. Bank, 901 F.2d 1449, 1457 (8th Cir. 1990) (same); Ben Cooper, 896
F.2d at 1404 (holding that in core proceedings, jury trials in bankruptcy courts
were not statutorily or constitutionally barred).
Two circuit courts have held that in non-core proceedings, bankruptcy
courts may not conduct jury trials because of constitutional considerations.
Taxel v. Electronic Sports Research (In re Cinematronics, Inc.), 916 F.2d 1444,
1450-51 (9th Cir. 1990); Beard v. Braunstein, 914 F.2d 434, 442-43 (3d Cir.
1990). For a further discussion of the constitutional concerns implicated by jury
trials in non-core proceedings, see supra notes 108-14 and accompanying text.
153. 28 U.S.C. §§ 157(b), 158(c) (1988). For a discussion of core proceed-
ings and non-core proceedings, see supra notes 51-58 and accompanying text.
154. Baker & Getty, 954 F.2d at 1173-74 (finding no express or implied au-
thority in BAFJA for bankruptcy courts to conduct jury trials); Kaiser Steel, 911
F.2d at 391-92 (same); United Missouri, 901 F.2d at 1454-57 (1990) (same). For a
further discussion of the three circuits that found no statutory authority for jury
trials in bankruptcy courts, see infra notes 157-62 and accompanying text.
155. Baker & Getty, 954 F.2d at 1173 n.10 (noting that because "bankruptcy
courts are not statutorily authorized to conduct jury trials, this court will not ad-
dress whether such an authorization would violate Article III of and the Seventh
Amendment to the United States Constitution"); Kaiser Steel, 911 F.2d at 389-92
(basing its holding on statutory grounds and not addressing constitutional is-
sues); United Missouri, 901 F.2d at 1454-57 (invalidating jury trials in bankruptcy
courts on statutory grounds, and noting that "we do not reach the constitutional
issues"). But see Cinenatronics, 916 F.2d at 1450-51 (invalidating jury trials in
non-core proceedings on constitutional grounds); Beard, 914 F.2d at 442-43
(same).
156. Ben Cooper, 896 F.2d at 1403-04. For a further discussion of Ben Cooper,
see infra notes 163-75 and accompanying text.
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to conduct jury trials. 157 All three courts employed the same reasoning
for invalidating jury trials in bankruptcy courts. These courts first stated
that the BAFJA contained no express grant of authority from Con-
gress. 15 8 After examining the statutory language and legislative history
of the BAFJA, all three circuit courts then concluded that both the lan-
guage and legislative history of the BAFJA were non-determinative in
ascertaining congressional intent.' 59 Thus, because the Sixth, Eighth
and Tenth Circuits found the express language of the BAFJA and its
legislative history unhelpful, they refused to imply from the BAFJA the
power of bankruptcy courts to conduct jury trials.' 60 For example, in
Rafoth v. National Union Fire Insurance Co. (In re Baker & Getty), 16 1 the Sixth
Circuit concluded that the legislative history of the BAFJA was unhelpful
because Congress, when enacting the BAFJA, did not contemplate the
Granfinanciera decision that preserved a Seventh Amendment guarantee
to a jury trial in proceedings transferred to bankruptcy courts.
16 2
2. The Reasoning of the Minority View
In contrast to the Sixth, Eighth and Tenth Circuits, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Ben Cooper determined
that Congress had in fact granted to bankruptcy courts the power to
conduct jury trials under the BAFJA.1 63 The Second Circuit recognized
157. For a list of the cases comprising the majority view, see infra note 159
and accompanying text.
158. Baker & Getty, 954 F.2d at 1173; Kaiser Steel, 911 F.2d at 391; United
Missouri, 901 F.2d at 1454.
159. Baker & Getty, 954 F.2d at 1173; Kaiser Steel, 911 F.2d at 392; United
Missouri, 901 F.2d at 1455. For example, in United Missouri, after the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit found the legislative history and
statutory language lacking any indication of congressional intent concerning
jury trials in the bankruptcy courts, the court noted that the "authority may still
be implied if it is incidental and necessary to make the legislation effective." Id.
The United Missouri court, however, declined to imply the power "[gliven the
absence of supporting legislative history, and the serious constitutional
problems posed by an alternative interpretation." Id. at 1457.
In Kaiser Steel, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit ex-
amined the holdings of the Eighth Circuit in United Missouri and the Second Cir-
cuit in Ben Cooper. Kaiser Steel, 911 F.2d at 390-91. The Kaiser Steel court found
the reasoning of the Eight Circuit compelling. Id. at 391. The court found par-
ticularly important the fact that Congress did not expressly provide for jury tri-
als in the BAFJA. Id. at 391-92 (noting that "Congress in the past has provided
expressly for jury trials in the Article I context").
In Baker & Getty, the Sixth Circuit determined that the statutory language of
the BAFJA offered "no insight into whether Congress intended for bankruptcy
courts to conduct jury trials in core proceedings." Baker & Getty, 954 F.2d at
1173. The Baker court emphasized the fact that there were no procedural rules
for conducting jury trials in bankruptcy courts. Id.
160. Baker & Getty, 954 F.2d at 1173; Kaiser Steel, 911 F.2d at 392; United
Missouri, 901 F.2d at 1457.
161. 954 F.2d 1169 (6th Cir. 1992).
162. Id. at 1173.
163. Ben Cooper, Inc. v. Insurance Co. (In re Ben Cooper, Inc.), 896 F.2d
228
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that the BAFJA contained no express provisions granting bankruptcy
courts the power to empaneljuries. 3 4 The Ben Cooper court instead im-
plied the power from two provisions of the BAFJA, section 151 and sec-
tion 157(b), in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Granfinanciera.16 5
Section 151 of the BAFJA states that " '[e]ach bankruptcy judge, as a
judicial officer of the district court, may exercise the authority conferred
under this chapter with respect to any action, suit or proceeding.' ",166
Section 157(b) gives bankruptcy courts in core proceedings the power to
hear and determine cases and issue final decisions. 16 7 The Ben Cooper
court determined that the bankruptcy courts' ability to conduct jury tri-
als is essential for the court to hear, determine and issue final decisions
in all cases referred to bankruptcy courts'after Granfinanciera.168 The
court combined this determination with the language from section
157(b) and section 151 to conclude that Congress must have intended
bankruptcy courts to conduct jury trials. 169
The Second Circuit also addressed some of the constitutional
ramifications of its decision. First, the Ben Cooper court addressed the
issue of whether Article III precluded jury trials in bankruptcy courts. 170
The Ben Cooper court asserted that if bankruptcy courts could enter final
decisions, then bankruptcy courts could also conduct jury trials. 17 1
Therefore, the dispositive question for the court was whether the ability
1394, 1404 (2d Cir.), vacated and remanded, 111 S. Ct. 425, reinstated, 924 F.2d 36
(2d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2041 (1991). The case in Ben Cooper in-
volved a contract between Ben Cooper, Inc. (Ben Cooper) and the Insurance
Company of Pennsylvania. Id. at 1396-97. Ben Cooper entered into the con-
tract with the insurance company after Ben Cooper had filed a Chapter 11 peti-
tion. Id. at 1396. The insurance company failed to pay a claim advanced by Ben
Cooper. Id. at 1396-97. As a result, Ben Cooper, Inc. brought an action assert-
ing a contract claim based on state law. Id. at 1397. The circuit court held that
the claim was "an essential part of administering the estate" of Ben Cooper, Inc.
Id. at 1400. Therefore, the Ben Cooper court concluded that a state law proceed-
ing to recover under a post-petition contract was "core." Id.
164. Id. at 1402.
165. Id. at 1402-03.
166. Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 151 (1988)).
167. Id.; see also 28 U.S.C. § 157(b) (1988). Section 157(b) states: "Bank-
ruptcy judges may hear and determine all cases under title 11 and all core pro-
ceedings arising under title 11, or arising in a case under title 11 . .. and may
enter appropriate orders and judgments ... Id.
168. Ben Cooper, 896 F.2d at 1402.
169. Id. The court in Ben Cooper stated that "[c]onstruing the Bankruptcy
Code to allow jury trials in the bankruptcy court is the only way to reconcile" the
statutory concerns with the United States Supreme Court's holding in
Granfinanciera. Id.
170. Id. at 1403.
171. Id. The court noted that "the practice of jury trials in Article I courts
has been upheld when the authority of the Article I judges does not otherwise
run afoul of Article III." Id. The Ben Cooper court postulated that the "primary
purpose of ... [Article III] is to ensure a federal judiciary free from pressure
from the other branches of government." Id. The court reasoned that juries
were more insulated than bankruptcy judges from pressure applied by the legis-
27
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of bankruptcy courts to enter final decisions in core proceedings was
constitutional. 172 To reach its conclusion, the court distinguished the
facts of Ben Cooper from those of Northern Pipeline, in which the Supreme
Court held that the particular power exercised by the bankruptcy court
was unconstitutional. 173 On this basis, the Ben Cooper court determined
that it was constitutional for the bankruptcy court to enter a final deci-
sion. 174 Following from this determination, the Ben Cooper court held
that Article III of the Constitution was not violated by the bankruptcy
court's exercise of its power to empanel a jury.
175
Second, the Second Circuit determined that congressional authority
for bankruptcy courts to conduct jury trials did not violate the Seventh
Amendment. 176 The court noted that in core proceedings, such as the
case at bar, the district court was not authorized to retry facts deter-
mined in the bankruptcy court. 177 The court found that because there
was no de novo review, the Seventh Amendment proscription against the
retrial of facts determined by a jury was not implicated. 178
III. ANALYSIS OF IN RE GRABILL CORPORATION
With the precedent set by the Supreme Court and the split among
circuit courts, the Seventh Circuit in In re Grabill Corp. was faced with
analyzing the permissibility ofjury trials in bankruptcy courts. This sec-
tion of this Note presents the facts of the case, followed by a description
of the court's decision and reasoning, followed by a critical analysis of
the court's decision. 179 While agreeing with the Grabill court's conclu-
lative and executive branches. Id. The court therefore concluded that the pur-
pose of Article III was furthered by utilizing jury trials in bankruptcy courts. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id. The circuit court distinguished the state contract claim in Ben
Cooper from the state contract claim before the Supreme Court in Northern Pipe-
line. Id. The court detailed that the state law claim in Northern Pipeline arose prior
to the debtor filing a bankruptcy petition, but that the debtor waited until after
filing the petition to bring the state cause of action against the defendant. Id. at
1348. The court noted that while the contract claim in Northern Pipeline was a
pre-petition contract claim, the contract claim at issue in Ben Cooper was a post-
petition claim. Id. at 1403. The court found that this fact sufficiently distin-
guished the case from Northern Pipeline. Id. For a discussion of Northern Pipeline,
see supra notes 125-50 and accompanying text.
174. Ben Cooper, 896 F.2d at 1403. The court stated that "[t]he conclusion
that core jurisdiction is constitutional . . . is implicit in our analysis." Id.
175. Id. at 1403-04.
176. Id. at 1403.
177. d.
178. Id. (stating that "[s]ince the jury verdict in a core proceeding is subject
only to the traditional standards of appellate review, such proceeding does not
violate the Seventh Amendment").
179. For a discussion of the facts of Grabill, see infra notes 181-91 and ac-
companying text. For a discussion of the reasoning of Grabill, see infra notes
192-272 and accompanying text. For an analysis of Grabill, see infra notes 273-
310 and accompanying text.
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sion that the BAJFA neither expressly nor impliedly authorizes bank-
ruptcy courts to conduct jury trials, this Note'asserts that several policy
determinations made by the court were improper.' 8 0
A. Facts and Procedural History
In 1986, the National Bank of North Carolina (National) extended a
twenty-five million dollar line of credit to Windsor-Hamilton, Ltd.
(Windsor-Hamilton), which was a holding company owned by the Gra-
bill Corporation (Grabill).' 8 ' William Stoeker, the sole shareholder of
Grabill, personally guaranteed the loans of Windsor-Hamilton.' 8 2 The
loans were partially repaid by money transfers from Windsor-Hamilton
and Grabill to National. '8 3 On January 31, 1989, other creditors of Gra-
bill and Windsor-Hamilton instituted involuntary Chapter 7 proceed-
ings.' 8 4 The bankruptcy trustee, appointed by the bankruptcy court,
filed suit against National in the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois for the return of the payments made by
Windsor-Hamilton and Grabill to National; the case was referred to a
bankruptcy court.18 5 The trustee alleged that the payments were prefer-
ential and fraudulent.18 6 National requested a jury trial.18 7 The parties
agreed that National was entitled to ajury trial, but the parties contested
whether the bankruptcy court had the power to empanel a jury.188 Na-
tional filed a petition for removal of the case to the district court.' 8 9
The district court denied the petition holding that the bankruptcy court
had the power to conduct jury trials.' 9 0 National brought an interlocu-
tory appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit. 191
B. The Seventh Circuit's Holding and Reasoning
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit reversed the district court's decision
and held that Congress had not granted authority to bankruptcy courts
180. For the conclusion of this Note, see infra notes 311-15 and accompa-
nying text.
181. Steinberg v. NCNB Nat'l Bank (In re Grabill Corp.), 133 B.R. 621, 622
(N.D. Ill. 1991).
182. Id.
183. Id. On May 6, 1988 Windsor paid $13,166,250 to National. Id. In
addition, Grabill made payments to National totaling $7,890,047 between Feb-
ruary 9, 1988 and May 5, 1988 to National. Id.
184. Id. The Chapter 7 proceedings later evolved into a Chapter 11 pro-
ceeding. Id.
185. Id. at 622-23.
186. Id. at 623.
187. Id.
188. Id.; In re Grabill Corp., 967 F.2d 1152, 1152 (7th Cir. 1992).
189. Grabill, 133 B.R. at 623.
190. Id. at 627.
191. Grabill, 967 F.2d at 1152.
NOTE
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to conduct jury trials, and, that "[wihere a jury trial is required by the
Seventh Amendment, that trial must be held in the district court."1 92
The Grabill court directed the district court to remove the case from the
bankruptcy court so that a district court could conduct a jury trial.' 9 3
To reach this holding, the Seventh Circuit examined whether the BAFJA
contained an express or implied grant of power for bankruptcy courts to
conduct jury trials to bankruptcy courts. 194 The court also examined
the policy considerations surrounding the jury trial issue.' 9 5
1. The Statutory Grant of Power to the Bankruptcy Courts
a. Analysis of the Language of the BAFJA
The Grabill court found no evidence in the BAFJA that Congress
expressly granted authority to bankruptcy courts to conduct jury tri-
als.' 9 6 Furthermore, the Grabill court refused to find an implied grant of
authority based on congressional intent. 197 To determine whether Con-
gress intended to grant bankruptcy courts the power to conduct jury
trials, the court first examined the language of the BAFJA. The Grabill
court found two sections of the BAFJA applicable: sections 1411 and
157(b)(5).1 98 Section 1411, the only section in the BAFJA expressly re-
ferring to jury trials, preserves the right to a jury trial in personal injury
and wrongful death tort actions in a bankruptcy proceeding.199 Section
157(b)(5) requires the removal of personal injury and wrongful death
claims from bankruptcy courts to district courts.20 0 The Grabill court
192. Id. at 1158.
193. Id. at 1158-59.
194. Id. at 1153-57.
195. Id. at 1157-58.
196. Id. at 1153. The court stated that "[t]here is no express statutory au-
thority in the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984 ...
granting bankruptcy courts the power to conduct jury trials; even the Second
Circuit recognizes this." Id. (citing Ben Cooper, Inc. v. Insurance Co. (In re Ben
Cooper, Inc.), 896 F.2d 1394, 1402 (2d Cir.), vacated and remanded, 111 S. Ct.
425, reinstated, 924 F.2d 36 (2d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2041 (1991)).
197. Id. at 1158 (noting that "it would be venturesome to hold that bank-
ruptcy courts are impliedly empowered by BAFJA to conduct jury trials in core
proceedings").
198. Id. at 1153. Section 1411 of the BAFJA provides:
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, this chapter
and title 11 do not affect any right to trial by jury that an individual has
under applicable nonbankruptcy law with regard to a personal injury or
wrongful death tort claim.
(b) The district court may order the issue arising under section 303 of
title 11 to be tried without jury.
28 U.S.C. § 1411 (1988).
199. 28 U.S.C. § 1411(a).
200. 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(5) (1988); see also Grabill, 967 F.2d at 1153-54. Sec-
tion 157 (b)(5) states:
The district court shall order that personal injury tort and wrong-
ful death claims shall be tried in the district court in which the bank-
232 [Vol. 38: p. 203
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noted that the inclusion of section 1411 combined with section
157(b)(5) could be read to indicate three different congressional mo-
tives.2 0 1 One interpretation of the express provision reserving the right
to a jury trial in personal injury and wrongful death claims is that Con-
gress intended that a right to a jury trial remain only in personal injury
and wrongful death actions.20 2 This interpretation infers from Con-
gress' express removal of personal injury and wrongful death cases that
Congress did not intend bankruptcy courts to conduct jury trials. 20 3 A
second interpretation of sections 1411 and 157(b)(5) is that Congress
intended all cases not expressly excluded from the bankruptcy court by
section 157(b)(5) to remain in bankruptcy courts'jurisdiction. 20 4 Thus,
under this interpretation, Congress intended bankruptcy courts to con-
duct jury trials in all cases except personal injury and wrongful death
actions.2 0 5 The final interpretation of sections 1411 and 157(b)(5), la-
belled by the Grabill court as the "realist" view, holds that Congress in-
cluded the two provisions in the BAFJA to alleviate the concerns of
personal injury attorneys that a right to ajury trial in personal injury and
wrongful death actions would be lost in bankruptcy courts. 20 6 Under
this view, the combination of sections 1411 and 157(b)(5) has a neutral
effect, and the intent of Congress concerning jury trials in the bank-
ruptcy courts cannot be ascertained.
20 7
After considering these three interpretations, the Grabill court con-
cluded that the combination of sections 1411 and 157(b)(5) implied that
Congress did not intend bankruptcy courts to have the power to conduct
jury trials. 20 8 The court cited its own reasoning in N.LS. Corp. v. Halla-
han (In re Hallahan)20 9 to support its conclusion. 2 10 In Hallahan, the
court noted that section 1411 replaced a broader jury trial provision.
2 11
Interpreting Congress' act as trying to narrow the scope of the jury trial
provision, the court found it more appropriate to adopt a narrow read-
ruptcy case is pending, or in the district court in the district in which
the claim arose, as determined by the district court in which the bank-
ruptcy case is pending.
28 U.S.C. § 157 (b)(5).
201. Grabill, 967 F.2d at 1153-54.




206. Id. at 1153 n.3 (noting the possibility that "Congress inserted the right
to jury trial in personal injury and wrongful death claims as a compromise with
the lawyers who represent personal injury plaintiffs" (quoting In re Clark, 75
B.R. 337, 339-40 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1987))).
207. Id.
208. Grabill, 967 F.2d at 1153.
209. 936 F.2d 1496 (7th Cir. 1991).
210. Grabill, 967 F.2d at 1153.
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ing of section 1411.212 Based upon such an interpretation of section
1411, the court determined that Congress intended no right to a jury
trial in any case but personal injury and wrongful death.
21 3
Moreover, the Grabill court stated that other sections of the BAFJA
similarly do not support the inference that Congress intended bank-
ruptcy judges to conduct jury trials. 2 14 The court closely examined the
language of section 157(b)(1), which provides that "[b]ankruptcy judges
may hear and determine . . .all core proceedings. ' 2 15 Once again, the
court conceded that this language could buttress contradictory infer-
ences of the intention of Congress concerning jury trials in bankruptcy
courts. 2 16 In one sense, the language can indicate that Congress, in
choosing the language "bankruptcy judges," intended a personal power
that extends to judges alone. 2 17 A contrary view noted by the court, is
that Congress, in choosing the language that it did, intended a compre-
hensive grant of authority to hear and determine core proceedings,
whether or not ajury was utilized. 2 18 The Grabill court determined that,
in its view, Congress intended bankruptcy judges to have only a per-
sonal power to hear and determine core proceedings; this personal
power does not include the ability to conduct jury trials. 2 19 The court
placed paramount importance on the fact that Congress did not ex-
pressly provide for jury trials.2 20 The court noted that in other circum-
stances where Congress wished to confer the authority to conduct jury
trials upon a court, Congress did so with express language.
2 2'
The court further supported its interpretation of the "hear and de-
termine" clause with the framework established for bankruptcy courts in
section 157 of the BAFJA. 222 Section 157 establishes a system in which
bankruptcy courts have more extensive authority in core proceedings
than in non-core proceedings. 22 3 According to the court, it was to show
this extension of power in core proceedings, not to authorize jury trials,
212. Id.; see also Grabill, 967 F.2d at 1154.
213. Grabill, 967 F.2d at 1154.
214. Id. at 1154.
215. 28 U.S.C. 157(b)(1); see also Grabill, 967 F.2d at 1154.
216. Grabill, 967 F.2d at 1154.
217. Id.
218. Id. (citing Gibson,Juty Trials, supra note 62, at 157 & n. 113).
219. Id. at 1155. The court stated that "[w]e agree... that the language of
157(b)(1) . . .indicates that the power conferred is a personal one, limited to
bankruptcy judges." Id.
220. Id. The court stated that "[w]e are entitled to assume that Congress
legislated with care in amending the Bankruptcy Act, and that had it intended to
provide for jury trials in bankruptcy court, it would 'not [have] left the matter to
mere implication.' " Id. (citing Palamore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389, 395
(1973)).
221. Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 636(a)(3), (c)(l), which authorizes federal mag-
istrates to conduct jury trials).
222. Id. at 1156; see also 28 U.S.C. § 157 (1988).
223. 28 U.S.C. § 157. For the text of § 157, see supra notes 49-52, 56-58.
234 [Vol. 38: p. 203
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that Congress authorized bankruptcy judges to hear and determine core
proceedings while only giving the authority to hear non-core proceed-
ings.22 4 The court supports this determination with an analogy to the
Magistrate Act, which contains similar hear and determine language. 2 25
Under the Magistrate Act, magistrates have the authority to conduct jury
trials.2 26 Unlike the BAFJA, Congress supplied a separate section in the
Magistrate Act expressly authorizing magistrates to conduct jury tri-
als. 22 7 This analogy supports the view that although the hear and deter-
mine language was to signal a more extensive authority for bankruptcy
judges in core proceedings, it should not be read to extend the authority
to conduct jury trials. According to the court, had Congress intended to
authorize bankruptcy courts to conduct jury trials in the BAFJA, it would
have stated that power explicitly in the BAFJA, as Congress did in the
Magistrate Act.
2 28
As a result of its analysis of the statutory language of the BAFJA, the
Grabill court concluded that the language did not warrant the implica-
tion that bankruptcy courts possessed the power to conduct jury
trials.2
29
b. Analysis of the Legislative History of the BAFJA
In a further attempt to determine congressional intent concerning
juries in bankruptcy courts, the Grabill court examined the legislative
history of the BAFJA. The court found the legislative history unhelpful
in resolving the jury trial issue.2 30 As an illustration of the quagmire
created by an investigation of the legislative history, the court examined
whether the history of the bankruptcy acts gave any indication of con-
gressional intent.23 1 Specifically, the court examined the invalidation of
the 1978 Act and the institution of the Emergency Rules, which the
224. Grabill, 967 F.2d at 1156.
225. Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) (1988)).
226. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1) (1988). The Magistrate Act provides:
Upon the consent of the parties, a full-time United States magistrate or
a part-time United States magistrate who serves as a full-time judicial
officer may conduct any or all proceedings in a jury or nonjury civil
matter and order the entry ofjudgment in the case, when specially des-




228. Grabill, 967 F.2d at 1156. The court also noted that the Magistrate Act
provides for direct appeal to an appellate court when a magistrate judge pre-
sides over ajury trial. Id. The Grabill court determined that a lack of such review
procedure in the BAFJA is a further indication that jury trials in bankruptcy pro-
ceedings should be referred to district courts. Id.
229. Id.
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BAFJA ultimately replaced. 23 2 The court determined that the infer-
ences it could draw from this history were susceptible to conflicting in-
terpretations. 233 One interpretation noted by the Grabill court was that
Congress intended the BAFJA to be restrictive concerning jury trials.
2 34
The Grabill court noted that the Emergency Rules contained an express
prohibition against jury trials in the bankruptcy courts.23 5 Because the
Emergency Rules were a response to the limitation of the power of
bankruptcy courts announced by Northern Pipeline, this interpretation
holds that Congress intended to retain the limitations of the Emergency
Rules. 23 6 An equally acceptable interpretation considered by the Grabill
court was that by not incorporating the express prohibition against jury
trials contained in the Emergency Rules, Congress intended bankruptcy
courts to conduct jury trials.23 7 As a result of the conflicting interpreta-
tions, the Grabill court concluded that "any attempt to glean implied
congressional authorization from the scant legislative history amounts
to an illusory search.",
2 38
Without the aid of legislative history or statutory language to indi-
cate the intent of Congress, the Grabill court refused to imply in the
BAFJA a grant of power to bankruptcy courts to conduct jury trials.
23 9
Further prompting the court to decide not to infer the power from the
BAFJA were the constitutional problems implicated by such an infer-
ence.240 Finally, the court was influenced by the fact that there were no
procedural rules enacted to control jury trials in bankruptcy courts.
24 1
2. Policy Considerations
In addition to concluding that statutory authority does not support
vesting bankruptcy courts with the power to conduct jury trials, the Gra-
bill court also addressed the policy concerns raised by its decision. The







238. Id. (quoting Leonard v. Wessel (In re Jackson), 118 B.R. 243 (Bankr.
E.D. Pa. 1990)).
239. Id. (stating that "[a]bsent any discernible intent from either statutory
language or legislative history, we are reluctant to infer in BAFJA authority that
Congress has not in any clear manner conferred").
240. Id. at 1157. The court stated that its "conclusion is also influenced by
the constitutional issue lurking in the background." Id. For a further discussion
of the constitutional limitations on the power of Congress to confer authority on
the bankruptcy courts, see supra, notes 66-150 and accompanying text.
241. Id. at 1155. The Grabill court recognized the repeal of Federal Rule of
Bankruptcy Procedure 9015, which "once provided for jury trials." Id.
236 [Vol. 38: p. 203
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modem bankruptcy scheme."'24 2 First, the Grabill court dismissed fears
as being "overstated" that requiring the district court to withdraw a case
from the bankruptcy court would lead to strategic abuse of a Seventh
Amendment right to a jury trial.2 4 3 The Grabill court also opined that if
strategic abuse will result from jury trials in bankruptcy matters, the
abuse will occur whether the matter is handled in the bankruptcy court
or the district court.24 4 Second, the Grabill court found that rather than
enhance efficiency, conducting jury trials in bankruptcy courts would in
fact thwart the bankruptcy courts' efficiency. 2 4 5 According to the Grabill
court, bankruptcy courts have neither the physical capacity nor the staff
needed to conduct jury trials. 24 6 Quoting the observations of other
courts, the Grabill court argued that the inherently time-consuming na-
ture ofjury trials cuts against the intent of Congress to keep bankruptcy
cases fast-paced.
2 4 7
C. The Dissenting Opinion
In contrast to the majority position in Grabill, the dissenting opin-
ion, authored by Judge Posner, adopted a liberal approach to the jury
trial issue. 24 8 Similar to the majority, Judge Posner determined that the
legislative history and the statutory language of the BAFJA did not indi-
cate a congressional intent to grant bankruptcy courts the power to con-
duct jury trials.2 49 Judge Posner attributed this congressional silence to
the fact that the issue was not "live" at the time the BAFJA was adopted
242. Id. at 1157 (citing Granfinanciera, S. A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 61 &
61 n.16).
243. Id. at 1157-58. The court invoked the United States Supreme Court's
reasoning in Granfinanciera to determine that strategic abuses would not result.
Id. (citing Granfinanciera, 492 U.S. at 63 n.17 (1988)). The United States
Supreme Court in Granfinanciera, when deciding whether to grant the right to a
jury trial in certain bankruptcy matters, stated:
It warrants notice, however, that the provision of jury trials in fraudu-
lent conveyance actions has apparently not been attended by substan-
tial difficulties under previous bankruptcy statutes; that respondent has
not pointed to any discussion of this allegedly serious problem in the
legislative history of the 1978 Act or the 1984 Amendments; that in
many cases defendants would likely not request jury trials ....
Granfinanciera, 492 U.S. at 63 n.17. For a discussion of the flaws of this reason-
ing, see infra note 297.
244. Grabill, 967 F.2d at 1158.
245. Grabill, 967 F.2d at 1157-58.
246. Id. at 1158 (quoting In re G. Weeks Sec. Inc., 89 B.R. 697, 710 (Bankr.
W.D.Tenn. 1988)).
247. Id. at 1158 (quoting G. Weeks, 89 B.R. at 710).
248. Id. at 1159-61 (Posner, J., dissenting).
249. Id. at 1159 (Posner, J., dissenting). Judge Posner illustrated how un-
availing interpretation of the statutory language in this case is: "On the one
hand the statute says that 'bankruptcyjudges [not juries] may hear and determine
... all core proceedings' but on the other hand this can be read as 'bankruptcy
judges may hear and determine ... all core proceedings [whether they are jury
or non-jury cases]." Id. (Posner, J., dissenting) (alteration in original).
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because the BAFJA was drafted prior to the Supreme Court's decision in
Granfinanciera preserving the right to a jury trial in proceedings referred
to bankruptcy courts. 250 In contrast to the majority, the dissent con-
cluded that courts are responsible for filling this statutory void and must
determine which court-bankruptcy or district-should have the power
to conduct jury trials in bankruptcy proceedings.
2 5 1
According to Judge Posner, the "practical considerations" concern-
ing jury trials in bankruptcy matters should determine which courts are
appropriate to conduct jury trials. 25 2 Judge Posner objected to the pol-
icy decisions of the majority, particularly the majority's determinations
that the efficiency of litigation would not suffer from its decision not to
grant bankruptcy courts the power, and that strategic abuses would not
result from the need to remove jury trials to the district courts. 2 53 Judge
Posner found that policy in fact weighed heavily in favor of the court
granting bankruptcy courts the power to conduct jury trials.2 5 4 With
respect to the issue of efficiency, Judge Posner noted that it is wasteful
of both the litigants' and the courts' time and money to require a case,
or part of a case, to be removed from the bankruptcy court to a different
forum and a different judge.2 55 Particularly troubling to Judge Posner
was the possibility that bankruptcy proceedings would be split, with the
segment requiring jury attention tried in the district court and the seg-
ment to which no right to a jury trial attaches heard in the bankruptcy
court. 25 6 The other policy concern raised by the majority was strategic
abuse of the federal court system.2 5 7 Judge Posner concluded that stra-
tegic abuse could result from a system that did not allow bankruptcy
judges to preside over juries. 2 58 A litigant who finds a particular bank-
ruptcy judge displeasing could elect a jury trial and thereby obtain a
250. Id. (Posner, J., dissenting).
251. Id. (Posner, J., dissenting) ("Congress had never even dreamed there
was such a question. We must decide."). Judge Posner is not alone in this ap-
proach. Judge Louis H. Pollak of the United States District Court for the East-
ern District of Pennsylvania also determined that because Congress was silent on
the issue ofjury trials in bankruptcy courts, it was the proper role of the court to
decide whether to grant the authority. Leonard v. Wessel (In re Jackson), 118
B.R. 243, 252 (E.D. Pa. 1990). Judge Pollak noted that "the responsible course
for the judiciary to take with respect to an issue which Congress didn't look at,
but which must now be resolved, is to resolve that issue along the lines that to
the judiciary makes most sense as a matter of judicial administration." Id. at
252. Judge Pollak concluded that it is more sensible to have the bankruptcy
courts conduct the jury trial in core proceedings. Id. Therefore, Judge Pollak
granted the bankruptcy court the power to conduct a jury trial. Id.
252. Grabill, 967 F.2d at 1159 (Posner, J., dissenting).
253. Id. at 1159-60 (Posner, J., dissenting).
254. Id. (Posner, J., dissenting).
255. Id. at 1159 (Posner, J., dissenting).
256. Id. (Posner, J., dissenting).
257. Id. at 1157-58 (Posner, J., dissenting).
258. Id. at 1159-60 (Posner, J., dissenting).
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different judge. 259 Furthermore, a litigant could use the jury trial re-
quest to stall the proceedings.
260
Judge Posner also found bankruptcy judges competent to conduct
jury trials. 2 6 1 According to Judge Posner, the fact that bankruptcy
judges lack life tenure does not make them unqualified to conduct jury
trials. 26 2 He noted a full list of situations and exceptions in which
judges who lack lifetime tenure conduct jury trials.2 63 Most notable to
Judge Posner were federal magistrates.2 64 Although they lack life ten-
ure, magistrates are permitted to conduct jury trials. 2 65 Judge Posner
emphasized that while bankruptcy judges enjoy a fourteen year tenure,
magistrates serve only an eight year term. 266 Judge Posner asserted that
this point "makes the case for allowing bankruptcy judges to conduct
jury trials stronger than the case for allowing magistrate judges to do
so."
2 6 7
Judge Posner also compared a bench trial to a jury trial. 2 68 He
found the only real difference between the two were voir dire and jury
instructions.2 69 Judge Posner found bankruptcy judges competent to
conduct voir dire and draftjury instructions. 270 As a result, Judge Posner
found that bankruptcy judges were capable of conducting jury trials and
found that lack of life tenure was not an obstacle to their presiding over
juries.
2 7 1
After finding bankruptcy judges competent to preside over jury tri-
259. Id. (Posner, J. dissenting).
260. Id. at 1159 (Posner, J., dissenting).
261. Id. at 1160 (PosnerJ., dissenting).
262. Id. at 1161 (Posner, J., dissenting).
263. Id. at 1160 (Posner, J. dissenting). Judge Posner stated:
Very few state trial judges have life tenure either, yet the vast majority
ofjury cases in this country are tried in state courts and we do not hear
howls of protest. Many federal judicial officers-not just bankruptcy
judges-lack life tenure yet conduct jury trials. Judges of the District of
Columbia superior court are one example. Judges of the territorial
courts are another.
Id. (Posner, J., dissenting).
264. Id. (Posner, J., dissenting).
265. Id. (Posner, J., dissenting).
266. Id. (Posner, J., dissenting).
267. Id. (Posner, J., dissenting). Judge Posner also addressed the concern
that litigants must consent to a jury before a magistrate judge, and therefore,
arguably, Congress would require similar consent in bankruptcy proceedings.
Id. Judge Posner dismissed this problem, however, by noting that the parties
must consent to all proceedings before a magistrate judge, not just those cases
involving a jury trial. Id. The BAFJA, on the other hand, does not require con-
sent of the parties for bankruptcy judges to enter final decisions in core proceed-
ings. Id.
268. Id. (Posner, J., dissenting).
269. Id. (Posner, J., dissenting).
270. Id. (Posner, J., dissenting).
271. Id. (Posner, J., dissenting).
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als, the dissent determined that the Grabill court should entrust bank-
ruptcy courts with the power to conduct jury trials. 27 2
D. Critical Analysis
This Note asserts that the Grabill majority effectively analyzed the
issue of whether bankruptcy courts had a statutory grant of authority
from Congress to conduct jury trials. 2 73 The Grabill court was consis-
tent with most courts and commentators when it noted that no express
grant of authority is present in the BAFJA. 2 74 In addition, the Grabill
court properly stated that, except for the wrongful death and personal
injury jury reservation clause in section 1411 of the BAFJA, the BAFJA
does not contain express language permitting jury trials in bankruptcy
courts. 2 75 Finally, it would take a strained interpretation of section
157(b) of the BAFJA, which grants bankruptcy courts the power to "hear
and determine" cases, to conclude that the "hear and determine" clause
expressly includes the authority of the bankruptcy courts to empanel
juries.
27 6
Equally accurate was the Grabill majority's determination that no im-
plied power exists in the BAFJA for bankruptcy courts to conduct jury
trials. 2 77 As the Grabill court properly noted, an attempt to infer from
the language of the BAFJA any congressional intent concerning jury tri-
als in bankruptcy courts leads to dual and conflicting conclusions. 2 78
The inclusion of sections 1411 and 157(b)(5) do not provide a solid
foundation on which to imply the authority for bankruptcy courts to
conduct jury trials. It is entirely possible that the "realist" view, which
purports that Congress included sections 1411 and 157(b)(5) in the
BAFJA to appease trial lawyers in order to hasten passage of the legisla-
tion, is the answer to why these sections are in the BAFJA. 2 7 9 Even if
the realist view is inaccurate, the arguments for and against an inference
of intent of Congress to authorize jury trials are equally strong. Thus,
272. Id. at 1160-61 (Posner, J., dissenting).
273. Grabill, 967 F.2d at 1153-57. For a further discussion of the majority's
analysis, see supra notes 196-247 and accompanying text.
274. Grabill, 967 F.2d at 1153. For a discussion of other courts and com-
mentators which have determined that there is no express authorization in the
BAFJA for bankruptcy courts to conduct jury trials, see supra note 62.
275. Grabill, 967 F.2d at 1153.
276. See Torcise v. Community Bank, 131 B.R. 503, 506 (S.D. Fla. 1991)
(concluding that the "hear and determine" language does not expressly grant
power to bankruptcy judges to conduct jury trials); Growers Packing Co. v.
Community Bank, 134 B.R. 438, 442 (S.D. Fla. 1991) (noting that although "the
bankruptcy court may 'hear and determine' all cases arising under Title 11 ...
that language does not, by itself, amount to an explicit grant of power to con-
duct jury trials").
277. Grabill, 967 F.2d at 1158.
278. Id. at 1153-54. For a discussion of these conflicting conclusions, see
supra notes 201-07 and accompanying text.
279. Grabill, 967 F.2d at 1153 n.3.
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the two sections are non-determinative on the issue and the status quo,
which precludes jury trials in bankruptcy courts without express or im-
plied authority, remains.
Furthermore, as other courts have also noted, there exists no legis-
lative history from which to glean congressional intent. 280 As the dis-
sent pointed out, the only clear conclusion as to the intention of
Congress concerning the BAFJA is that Congress did not anticipate the
Granfinanciera holding that the Seventh Amendment guarantees a jury
trial right in a limited number of bankruptcy proceedings. 28 1- Thus,
Congress must never have considered the issue of jury trials in bank-
ruptcy courts when drafting the BAFJA.
The Grabill majority also explored the possibility of implying the
power of bankruptcy courts to conduct jury trials from the history of
statutory grants of authority from Congress to the bankruptcy courts. 2 82
Through this investigation, the Grabill court attempted to ascertain
whether the statutory grants of authority from Congress to bankruptcy
courts in the past indicated a present congressional intent in the BAFJA
concerning jury trials. 2 83 As the positions of other courts suggest, the
Grabill court could have interpreted this legislative history as being: (1)
neutral on the issue; (2) weighing against the grant of power to bank-
ruptcy courts to conduct jury trials; or (3) weighing in favor of the grant
of power.2 84 The Grabill court chose to interpret the legislative history
280. See, e.g., Citicorp N. Am., Inc. v. Finley (In re Washington Mfg. Co.),
133 B.R. 113, 118 (M.D. Tenn. 1991) (noting that "the Congressional debates
concerning the 1984 Act are silent as to whether bankruptcy courts can conduct
jury trials"); Torcise, 131 B.R. at 507 (finding legislative history unhelpful in de-
termining intent of Congress concerning jury trials in bankruptcy courts); Leo-
nard v. Wessel (In reJackson), 118 B.R. 243, 250 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (noting that
issue of jury trials in bankruptcy courts was not addressed by Congress).
281. See Grabill, 967 F.2d at 1159 (Posner, J., dissenting) (noting that "Con-
gress had never even dreamed there was such a question").
282. Grabill, 967 F.2d at 1154. For a discussion of the Grabill court's explo-
ration of the statutes leading up to the BAFJA, see supra notes, 230-38 and ac-
companying text. For a further discussion of the history of statutory grants of
authority from Congress to the bankruptcy courts, see supra note 34-46 and ac-
companying text.
283. Grabill, 967 F.2d at 1154.
284. Because Congress did not contemplate the bankruptcy court/jury trial
issue when it enacted the BAFJA, courts may interpret the legislative history of
the BAFJA as silent on the issue of jury trials in bankruptcy courts. See Torcise,
131 B.R. at 506 n.7 (noting that "[m]uch of the legislative history suggests that
Congress never contemplated that jury trials would be required in proceedings
designated as core"). Courts have interpreted the turbulent history of the previ-
ous bankruptcy acts, however, as indicating that Congress intended to grant
bankruptcy courts minimal power, so as to prevent the BAFJA from being held
unconstitutional. See, e.g., Gumport v. Growth Fin. Corp. (In re Transcon Lines),
121 B.R. 837, 844 (C.D. Cal. 1990). Some courts have interpreted the legislative
history to imply that Congress wanted to give the bankruptcy courts as much
power as possible without implicating the problems of Northern Pipeline. See Cit-
icorp North America, 133 B.R. at 118 (finding that history of statutory grants from
Congress to bankruptcy courts "suggests that Congress intended bankruptcy
NOTE
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as non-determinative on the issue. 28 5 Because the arguments for the
three alternatives are equally strong, the court's decision to hold that
the legislative history as non-determinative is credible.
28 6
The majority's conclusions regarding the lack of value of the legisla-
tive history and statutory language appear to be supported by dicta in
the Granfinanciera decision.2 87 The Court in Granfinanciera recognized
the ambiguity in the legislative history and in the statutory provisions of
the BAFJA.
28 8
Finally, the constitutional ramifications surrounding the presence of
jury trials in bankruptcy courts required the Grabill court to approach
the issue prudently. Jury trials in bankruptcy courts are susceptible to
challenge on the basis of both the Seventh Amendment and separation
of powers doctrine. As the majority in Grabill properly noted, a court
"should 'avoid an interpretation of a federal statute that engenders con-
stitutional issues if a reasonable alternative poses no constitutional ques-
tion.' "289 The majority was correct not to infer the power of
bankruptcy courts to conductjury trials in the face of constitutional trap-
pings when the legislative history and statutory language of the BAFJA
do not provide a strong indication of the intention of Congress.
290
The Grabill majority did not fully address the dissent's method of
courts to" have the power to conduct jury trials). Other courts further support
this proposition by noting that the Emergency Rule expressly forbade jury trials
in the bankruptcy courts. See, e.g., Dailey v. First Peoples Bank, 76 B.R. 963, 967
(D.N.J. 1987). These courts reasoned that by omitting from the BAFJA the pro-
hibition against jury trials contained in the Emergency Rule, Congress intended
the bankruptcy courts to have the power to conduct jury trials. See, e.g., id.
("Had Congress intended to abrogate the bankruptcy court's authority to em-
panel juries, it would have enacted the Emergency Rule to accomplish that.");
McCormick v. American Investors Management, Inc. (In re McCormick), 67 B.R.
838, 842 (D. Nev. 1986) (emphasizing that Congress did not incorporate into
BAFJA express prohibitions against jury trials in bankruptcy courts that were
contained in Emergency Rule); Walsh v. Long Beach Honda (In re Gaildeen In-
dus., Inc.), 59 B.R. 402, 406 (N.D. Cal. 1986) (finding dispositive of congres-
sional intent the fact that Congress enacted most of rules of Emergency Rule but
omitted express prohibition of jury trials in BAFJA).
285. Grabill, 967 F.2d at 1154.
286. For a discussion of the possible interpretations of the history of the
statutory grants of power to the bankruptcy courts, see supra notes 230-38.
287. See Granfinanciera, S. A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 40-41 n.3 (1989).
The Court characterized the BAFJA as "notoriously ambiguous." Id. at 40 n.3.
The Granfinanciera Court discussed the possible interpretations of the statutory
language of the BAFJA with respect to Congress' intent concerning jury trials.
Id. at 40-41 n.3. The Court also recognized the quagmire concerning the inter-
pretation of BAFJA's legislative history. Id.
288. Id.
289. Grabill, 967 F.2d at 1157 (quoting Gomez v. United States, 490 U.S.
858, 864 (1989)).
290. Id. at 1158. For a further discussion of the constitutional implication
of the grant of power to the bankruptcy court to conduct jury trials, see supra
notes 66-150 and accompanying text.
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empowering bankruptcy courts with the ability to conduct jury trials-
that is, by allowing the court to decide which court should conduct the
jury trials based on "practical considerations."'2 9 1 Instead, the majority
briefly discussed the policy implications of its decision, indicating that
policy favored the exclusion ofjuries in bankruptcy courts.2 92 This con-
clusion by the majority is misdirected. In fact, policy weighs in favor of
bankruptcy courts having the power to preside over juries.2 93 Three
policy concerns point to this conclusion.
One policy concern is efficiency. While the majority emphasizes the
time-consuming nature of jury trials generally, it failed to adequately
address the possibility that gross inefficiency will result to the entire fed-
eral court system if bankruptcy courts are not permitted to conduct jury
trials in "core proceedings" where the Seventh Amendment guarantees
the right to a jury trial.2 94 Such inefficiency outweighs any inefficiency
that would occur in bankruptcy courts if bankruptcy courts were permit-
ted to conduct jury trials. As an example of the inefficiency that results
from the Grabill decision, consider that after Grabill, district courts will
be required to remove bankruptcy proceedings from bankruptcy courts
to district courts when a jury trial is requested. Litigants would then be
required to re-docket their cases in the district courts, causing consider-
able delay in the proceedings. 29 5 A further example illustrates an ex-
treme case of inefficiency that could result from the Grabill decision.
Suppose, hypothetically, that a district court refers a case to a bank-
ruptcy court pursuant to the BAFJA. The parties prepare for adjudica-
tion in that forum, and the case is docketed. A litigant then requests a
jury trial where the case qualifies for a Seventh Amendment jury trial
guarantee. Under Grabill, the case would be required to be removed
back to the district court. In cases where a Seventh Amendment right
attaches only to a specific portion of the claim, only that portion of the
claim would be removed to the district court. As a result, the parties
find themselves trapped in a bifurcated proceeding.
29 6
291. See Grabill, 967 F.2d at 1153-58. For a further discussion of the
method used by the dissent to grant authority to bankruptcy courts to conduct
jury trials, see supra notes 248-72 and accompanying text.
292. See Grabill, 967 F.2d at 1157-58. The court was "unpersuaded by prag-
matic arguments." Id. at 1157. For a further discussion of the policy determina-
tions of the majority, see supra notes 242-47.
293. See Taxel v. Marine Midland Business Loans, Inc., (In re Palomar Elec.
Supply, Inc.), 138 B.R. 959, 963 (S.D. Cal. 1992) (finding no statutory grant of
power but noting that "it would be preferable for all core proceedings to be
tried before the bankruptcy court").
294. See Grabill, 967 F.2d at 1159 (Posner, J., dissenting) (noting that ineffi-
ciency will result if bankruptcy courts are not permitted to conduct jury trials).
295. See Baird, supra note 114, at 11 (noting that "if the bankruptcy judge
cannot conduct a jury trial, the trustee has to wait for a place on the docket of
the district court").
296. See Nashville City Bank & Trust Co. v. Armstrong (In re River Transp.
Co.), 35 B.R. 556, 560 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1983) (discussing possibility of bifur-
19931 NOTE 243
41
Delany: In re Grabill Corporation: Another No for Jury Trials in the Bank
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1993
244 VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38: p. 203
A jury trial will slow court proceedings regardless of whether the
case is in a bankruptcy court or a district court. 29 7 When a bankruptcy
court is permitted to conduct the jury trial, however, the need to with-
draw from a bankruptcy court and have the case re-docketed in a federal
district court is eliminated. 298 Also eliminated is the need for the par-
ties to prepare for a new forum. Finally, the risk that a bifurcated pro-
ceeding will burden the court and the litigants is diminished. 2 99
Although it can be argued that it was the intent of Congress for bank-
ruptcy courts to function swiftly, and any inception of jury trials into
bankruptcy courts will slow the courts and frustrate that intention, it
does not appear that the introduction of jury trials into bankruptcy
courts in the limited number of cases in which a Seventh Amendment
guarantees a right to ajury trial would upset the entire bankruptcy court
cated proceedings if bankruptcy judges were not allowed to empaneljury). The
court in Nashville stated that "the bifurcation of jury trials from other matters
before the bankruptcy court would raise complex questions of procedure and
cause needless delay." Id. In McCormick v. American Investors Management,
Inc. (In re McCormick), 67 B.R. 838 (D. Nev. 1986), the policy consideration that
the court found most dispositive in favor ofjury trials in the bankruptcy courts
was the problems created by bifurcated proceedings. Id. at 843. The court
stated that "[m]ost importantly, bifurcating jury trials from other matters before
the bankruptcy court would cause complex procedural questions and needless
delay." Id.; see also River Transportation, 35 B.R. at 560 (raising procedural con-
cerns that would result from bifurcated proceedings).
297. Although the majority in Grabill properly noted that permitting jury
trials in bankruptcy courts might slow down the bankruptcy system, the effi-
ciency analysis should not center on the bankruptcy courts alone. Instead, an
additional consideration must be the benefit to the entire federal court system.
See M & E Contractors, Inc. v. Kugler-Morris General Contractors, Inc., 67 B.R.
260, 267 (N.D. Tex. 1986) (noting that delay of jury trials in bankruptcy court
would frustrate efficiency of bankruptcy courts). Examining the effect of jury
trials in the bankruptcy courts on the efficiency of the federal courts, the court in
M & E Contractors noted that "a wholesale diversion of jury trials to district
courts [would not] alleviate delays, considering the state of the typical federal
district court docket." Id.; see also Young v. PeterJ. Saker, Inc. (In re Paula Saker
& Co.), 37 B.R. 802, 810 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1984) ("[I]t [cannot] be gainsaid that
referring all jury trials to the district court would serve the purpose of delay
because of the district court's 'crowded calendars.' " (quoting Salomon v. Kaiser
(In re Kaiser), 722 F.2d 1574, 1581 (2d Cir. 1983))).
The Grabill majority's analysis is further flawed because it misapplied the
reasoning of the United States Supreme Court in Granfinanciera. See Grabill, 967
F.2d at 1157-58. In Granfinanciera, however, the United States Supreme Court
was addressing policy concerns surrounding the introduction of jury trials in
core proceedings as they affected the federal court system as a whole.
Granfinanciera, S. A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 63 n.17 (1989). The Supreme
Court was not addressing the virtues of one forum over another for the pur-
poses of conducting jury trials, as the Grabill court attempted to do. Id.
298. See Paula Saker, 37 B.R. at 810 (noting that allowing cases to remain in
bankruptcy courts for jury trials would "give 'all litigants a better opportunity to
have their day in court' " (quoting Salomon v. Kaiser (In re Kaiser), 722 F.2d
1574, 1581 (2d Cir. 1983))).
299. For a further discussion of the problems created by bifurcated pro-
ceedings, see supra note 296 and accompanying text.
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system. The negative effects of requiring removal to district courts, bur-
dening individual litigants and the federal court system as a whole, are
more probable in light of the need to change forums and far outweigh
any detriment resulting from maintaining the action in the bankruptcy
court.
The second policy concern raised by the Grabill court is strategic
abuse of procedural rules.3 00 The majority in Grabill failed to consider
the fact that the tactical use of the right to a jury trial would result from
its system. 301 As the dissent noted, after the majority's decision in Gra-
bill, when a litigant requests a jury trial, a new judge and a new forum
must accompany the jury trial.30 2 The litigants can use the jury trial
request to avoid the assigned judge in the bankruptcy court. 30 3 Thus, a
rule requiring removal to a district court when a Seventh Amendment
right to a jury trial is exercised turns the Seventh Amendment request
for a jury trial into a pretext to forum shopping within the federal sys-
tem . 0 4 A further tactical abuse is delaying the bankruptcy proceedings
through the use of ajury trial request. 30 5 Delay would result from shift-
ing the case from the bankruptcy court to the district court and having
to re-docket the case in the district court.
3 0 6
300. See Grabill, 967 F.2d at 1157, 1159.
301. See Nashville City Bank & Trust Co. v. Armstrong (In re River Transp.
Co.), 35 B.R. 556, 560 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1983). The River Transportation court
stated that "[pirocedural entanglements" resulting from removal to district
court "will not only obstruct and hinder the administration of the bankruptcy
estate but also tempt parties to use ajury trial request as a delaying device." Id.
302. Grabill, 967 F.2d at 1159 (Posner, J., dissenting). Judge Posner noted
that in the federal system, usually "a demand for a jury trial is not a demand for
a different judge, let alone a different kind ofjudge." Id. He noted that in bank-
ruptcy cases, however, the demand for a jury trial will be accompanied by a dif-
ferent judge in a different forum. Id.
303. See id. (Posner, J., dissenting) (noting that after Grabill decision, "a
party to a bankruptcy proceeding who for whatever reason would like to have a
different judge has an incentive to demand trial by jury").
304. See id. (Posner, J., dissenting) ("Juries will be dragged into cases be-
cause litigants dislike particular judges.").
305. See, e.g., Young v. PeterJ. Saker, Inc. (In re Paula Saker & Co.), 37 B.R.
802, 810 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1984). In Young, the court determined under the facts
that when the attorney in the case requested a jury trial for two litigants he did
not represent, the attorney was using the request for the purpose of stalling the
proceedings. Id. The court noted that the filing "serves to indicate that the
demand was made primarily to achieve delay." Id. The court determined that
retention in the bankruptcy court "would afford less opportunity for a party to
achieve delay." Id.
306. See Nashville City Bank & Trust Co. v. Armstrong (In re River Transp.
Co.), 35 B.R. 556, 560 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1983) ("Procedural entanglements
... will not only obstruct and hinder the administration of the bankruptcy estate
but also tempt parties to use a jury trial request as a delaying device."); Baird,
supra note 114, at 11 ("Negotiations are the lifeblood of bankruptcy practice and
bargaining positions frequently turn on the procedures that can be invoked and
the delays that accompany them."). As noted by the court in Paula Saker, bank-
ruptcy litigation is particularly susceptible to delay. Paula Saker, 37 B.R. at 810.
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A third policy concern, which was not addressed by the Grabill ma-
jority, is the burden a system not permitting the bankruptcy court to
conduct jury trials will place on a litigant who is deciding whether to
exercise a Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial.3 0 7 The litigant is
forced to decide if the benefits of the constitutional right to a jury trial
are outweighed by the resulting change in judges, change in forums,
bifurcation of proceedings and time delays. These burdens needlessly
complicate a litigant's decision to request a jury trial, and in the extreme
case, the burdens may be so oppressive to a litigant that, in practical
terms, the right to a jury trial is no right at all.
Taking into consideration the increased burden placed on both the
individual litigant and the court system, the policy in favor of bankruptcy
courts conducting jury trials outweighs the policy militating against jury
trials in bankruptcy courts. These policy concerns are sufficient to man-
date legislation that would empower bankruptcy courts to conduct jury
trials.
Ultimately, however, the policy considerations that support grant-
ing power to bankruptcy courts to preside over jury trials are irrelevant
if such grant of power is unconstitutional. The constitutional ramifica-
tions of such a grant of power are unclear. This grant of power has the
potential to implicate problems under both the Seventh Amendment
and Article III of the Constitution. 30 8 Congress could incorporate cer-
tain safeguards into legislation expressly granting power to bankruptcy
courts to conduct jury trials. These safeguards would increase the likeli-
hood that federal courts would uphold the constitutionality of the grant.
To avoid constitutional problems, the legislature should provide
safeguards that would limit the jury trial power strictly to core proceed-
ings. If the grant of authority is limited to "core proceedings" then the
legislation will not contravene the Seventh Amendment restriction on
judicial review of jury decisions.
In addition, the power given to bankruptcy courts to empaneljuries
should be limited to cases where a Seventh Amendment guarantee to a
jury trial is invoked pursuant to the Granfinanciera holding. The policy
considerations for conducting jury trials in bankruptcy courts when the
Seventh Amendment grants the right to a jury trial are compelling.
The court also noted that "[t]he function of a trustee, in large measure, con-
cerns liquidating assets and recovering preferences and fraudulent conveyances
so that the creditors of the estate may be paid quickly in accordance with the
priorities accorded by the Code. Delay in that process is to be discouraged, not
encouraged." Id.
307. Grabill, 967 F.2d at 1159 (PosnerJ., dissenting) (noting that required
removal from bankruptcy court to district court "injects extraneous considera-
tions into a party's decision on whether to demand a jury trial").
308. For a complete discussion of the Seventh Amendment constraints on
jury trials in the bankruptcy courts, see supra, notes 69-118 and accompanying
text. For a complete discussion of the Article III limitations on jury trials in the
bankruptcy courts, see supra, notes 119-50 and accompanying text.
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These policy concerns, however, are not implicated if bankruptcy courts
are given the authority to conduct jury trials when the Seventh Amend-
ment does not guarantee a jury trial. If the federal courts find that jury
trials in bankruptcy courts violate a federal rule, the federal courts are
more likely to make an exception to the rule where compelling policy
considerations are involved. Therefore, the legislature should not taint
the grant of authority by making the grant over-expansive. Finally, Con-
gress should provide the district courts with as much control over a
bankruptcy court's power to conduct jury proceedings as possible to
avoid unconstitutionality under Northern Pipeline; this control should fall
just short of removal to the district court.a0 9 The district court should
also maintain considerable appellate review. A possible safeguard to the
Article III concerns is to submit the bankruptcy judge's determination of
law to a stricter standard of review, increasing the control of district
courts over bankruptcy proceedings. One commentator has even sug-
gested allowing de novo review of bankruptcy judges' findings of law,
while submitting the jury's findings of fact to a more deferential stan-
dard. °1 0 These safeguards would help to protect the legislation against
Article III problems.
IV. CONCLUSION
In Grabill, the Seventh Circuit joined the majority of circuit courts in
determining that the BAFJA does not contain either an express or an
implied statutory grant of power to bankruptcy judges to conduct jury
trials. 3 ' Constitutional considerations alone weigh heavily against the
309. The structure of the 1984 Act makes the bankruptcy courts an adjunct
of the district courts. 28 U.S.C. § 157. The district courts maintain sufficient
control over the bankruptcy courts so that the Northern Pipeline holding is not
implicated. Cyr, supra note 85, at 55 (noting that Northern Pipeline holding not
implicated by BAFJA because "bankruptcy judge may only exercise whatever ju-
risdiction is delegated by the district court"). Congress, when granting the
power to bankruptcy courts to empanel juries, should reserve sufficient control
in the district courts so that Northern Pipeline is not implicated. Cyr suggests that
this may not be possible. Id. at 61. Cyr states that in order to meet the require-
ments of the Seventh Amendment, the federal courts would be restricted to ap-
pellate review. Id. Thus, the district court will have yielded too much control to
bankruptcy courts in violation of Article III. Id.
310. See Baird, supra note 114, at 12-13. Baird stated:
One might argue that, when there is a jury trial, the district court
could review the bankruptcy judge de novo on questions of law and
apply a deferential standard of review to the jury verdict. Article III
requires supervision only of what the judges does below, not of what
the jury does. Hence, one can satisfy Article III by scrutinizing the de-
cisions of the judge on questions of law, but satisfy the seventh amend-
ment by applying a deferential standard of review on matters of fact.
Id. at 12.
311. For the Grabill court's determination that no express authority exists
for the bankruptcy courts to conduct jury trials, see supra note 196 and accompa-
nying text. For a discussion of the Grabil court's refusal to infer the power to
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court implying the power. 3 12 However, while the court's decision is in
keeping with present law, the court's decision does not change the fact
that there are serious policy concerns that weigh against the court's in-
terpretation of the BAFJA. 31 3 The only solution to resolving these pol-
icy concerns is for Congress to amend the BAFJA. Inefficiency and
tactical abuses will result if the statute is not changed. Furthermore, a
litigant's exercise of his or her right to a jury trial will continue to be
chilled by unnecessary negative consequences that accompany the deci-
sion to request a jury trial. Congress should alleviate these problems by
granting to bankruptcy courts the power to empaneljuries in the specific
"core proceedings" where a jury trial is required to satisfy the Seventh
Amendment. 3 14 Congress can incorporate certain safeguards into the
legislation to increase the likelihood that federal courts will find the
grant of power constitutional. 3 15 In addition, such legislation would
force federal courts to address directly the constitutionality ofjury trials
in bankruptcy courts. Direct consideration of this issue by federal courts
would add clarity to bankruptcy law and eliminate wasteful litigation
over the jury trial issue.
William J. Delany
conduct jury trials in the bankruptcy courts from the intent of Congress, see
supra notes 197-221 and accompanying text.
312. For a discussion of the constitutional problems created if jury trials
were conducted in the bankruptcy court, see supra notes 66-150 and accompany-
ing text.
313. For a further discussion of the policy concerns created by the need to
remove bankruptcy cases from bankruptcy courts to district courts when the Sev-
enth Amendment guarantee is invoked, see supra notes 292-307 and accompany-
ing text.
314. For a further discussion of the cases in which the Seventh Amendment
right to a jury trial attaches, see supra notes 69-98 and accompanying text.
315. For a further discussion of the safeguards Congress can incorporate
into legislation that grants bankruptcy courts the authority to conduct jury trials,
see supra notes 308-10 and accompanying text.
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